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In the past three years, the Supreme Court has twice ruled that Con-
gress’s moral bars to trademark protection violate the First Amendment.
Those rulings raise a simple question in other areas of intellectual property.
Does the First Amendment preclude Congress from denying patent or cop-
yright protection based on a moral reason? Congress, for instance, might
deny patent protection for inventions directed toward the consumption of
marijuana. Inventors would accordingly choose not to disclose knowledge
about those inventions to the public, and the denial would chill their
speech. Similarly, Congress would chill speech if it denied copyright pro-
tection for moral reasons. A copyright bar to statues of the Confederacy,
for instance, would deter artists from speaking such content. Hence,
through patent and copyright, Congress might seek to influence speech in
accord with its moral viewpoint. This Article considers whether that use of
intellectual property would violate the First Amendment.
The Article concludes that moral denials in patent and copyright may be
constitutionally permissible in certain instances. On the patent side, Con-
gress’s choices about which invention to patent may plausibly be construed
as government speech, suggesting the absence of any First Amendment vio-
lation. Yet even if those choices are not government speech, they represent
Congress’s attempt to regulate conduct relating to the embodiments of the
inventions—not the knowledge about the inventions. That suggests that the
incidental effect on an inventor’s speech is permissible.
Copyright law is a different matter. The copyright system appears to
comprise a limited public forum, which implies that moral denials of copy-
right protection must be viewpoint neutral to pass First Amendment mus-
ter. In other words, moral denials of copyright protection may be
permissible but only if the reason for denial is not related to the expres-
sion’s message or effects responsive to that message. This principle severely
limits Congress’s power. Thus, for moral denials of patent protection, the
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First Amendment affords Congress broad discretion whereas for moral de-
nials of copyright protection, it affords Congress very limited discretion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN  the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, Congress might believe itwise to deny patent protection for inventions that cause infectiousdiseases in humans. That makes sense. Intellectual property should
not support outcomes that are bad for society, so Congress should re-
move the economic incentive to create inventions that further human suf-
fering. Yet this simple proposition has broad implications: it suggests that
Congress might deny intellectual property protection for other morally
controversial intellectual creations. Suppose that Congress were to deny
copyright protection for certain expressions that cause social harm. For
instance, the recent public uproar over statues of the Confederacy might
lead Congress to deny them copyright protection.1 Other moral denials
might include patent denials for abortion instruments,2 marijuana de-
vices,3 or human-torture methods,4 and copyright denials for pornogra-
phy,5 fake news,6 or mass-shooting videos.7 In short, Congress might seek
to define the scope of patentable inventions and copyrightable expression
based on moral judgments about certain subject matters.
The question that follows is whether such denials of intellectual prop-
erty would violate the First Amendment. From one perspective, denying
1. See Alisha Ebrahimji, Artemis Moshtaghian & Lauren M. Johnson, Confederate
Statues Are Coming Down Following George Floyd’s Death. Here’s What We Know, CNN
(July 1, 2020, 3:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/09/us/confederate-statues-removed-
george-floyd-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/F8VC-2FUL].
2. Cf. Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act, S. 311, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019).
3. Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B), (c)(c)(10) (2016) (listing marijuana as a schedule I
drug that “has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States”).
4. Cf. Paul LeBlanc, Pelosi Says a Police ‘Chokehold Is a Lynching’ and She’s Confi-
dent Republicans Will Agree to Ban Them, CNN (June 15, 2020, 10:37 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/06/15/politics/pelosi-police-reform-chokehold-cnntv/index.html [https://
perma.cc/V3UB-79KF].
5. Cf. Eliminating Pornography from Agencies Act, H.R. 680, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
6. Cf. Opposing Fake News and Alternative Facts, H.R. Res. 284, 116th Cong. (2019).
7. Cf. James N. Meindl & Jonathan W. Ivy, Mass Shootings: The Role of the Media in
Promoting Generalized Imitation, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 368, 368–70 (2017).
166 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
protection does not seem relevant to free speech.8 Restricting patent pro-
tection affects the manufacturing and sale of inventions—not speech.9
Restricting copyright protection affects a speaker’s ability to exclude
others from copying or publishing her speech, but it does not imply any
punishment or penalty for speaking.10 Hence, denials of intellectual prop-
erty protection arguably do not present First Amendment problems.
For decades, this was the prevailing view.11 Congress, for instance, has
barred patent protection for inventions “directed to or encompassing a
human organism.”12 The bar apparently reflects Congress’s moral judg-
ment about the sanctity of human life.13 When Congress passed this bar
in 2011, no one thought to argue that it might abridge free speech.
Two recent trademark cases call this view into question. In 2017, and
again in 2019, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress’s denial of trade-
mark protection for a moral reason violated the First Amendment.14 In
Matal v. Tam, the Court considered Congress’s denial of trademark regis-
tration for marks that could “disparage” people,15 and in Iancu v.
Brunetti, for marks that comprised “immoral” or “scandalous” subject
matter.16 These denials of protection, the Court held in both cases,
amounted to an abridgment of free speech.17 Although the Court never
explained how a denial of trademark protection constituted an act of
abridgment, the apparent implication of its holdings is that denying the
economic benefit of an intellectual property right chills speakers from ex-
pressing certain content. A trademark owner is less likely to use a dispar-
aging, immoral, or scandalous mark if she cannot register it for
protection. Both cases imply that such a chilling represents an unconstitu-
tional restriction of free speech.
Based on this implication of Tam and Brunetti, denying protection for
copyright and patent may arguably be viewed as a speech-restrictive act.
Clearly, copyright denials restrict speech. Congress specifically targets ex-
pressive content when denying copyright protection for a certain subject
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (listing rights of a patent).
10. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing rights of a copyright).
11. See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“With respect to appel-
lant’s First Amendment rights, it is clear that the PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark
does not affect his right to use it. No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expres-
sion is suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would not be
abridged by the refusal to register his mark.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)), over-
ruled by Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
12. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284,
340 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (“[N]o patent may issue
on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”).
13. See Dennis Crouch, Patents Encompassing a Human Organism, PATENTLYO (Dec.
2, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/12/ex-parte-kamrava.html [https://perma.cc/
FQ8G-GYMU] (“The language of Section 33(a) was initially pushed by Representative
Dave Weldon as a measure to support the sanctity of life.”).
14. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019); Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
15. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
16. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297.
17. Id.; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
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matter. And speakers seeking a copyright are not likely to speak un-
copyrightable content. Hence, denying the economic benefit of a copy-
right abridges free speech—just as in Tam and Brunetti.18
In the patent context, though, the argument is not as strong. On the
one hand, the speech of inventors does seem to be affected by a patent
denial, for an invention constitutes technical knowledge about a device or
process.19 By denying patent protection for a particular invention, Con-
gress appears to chill inventors from sharing their knowledge about de-
vices or processes. On the other hand, Congress’s granting of patent
protection might be viewed as Congress adopting inventors’ speech as its
own.20 If that view is correct, Congress’s choice not to grant patents for a
certain subject matter would not be an unconstitutional abridgment of
inventors’ speech. It would reflect Congress’s choice of which speech to
adopt, which seems plausible. Nevertheless, the conclusion is not abso-
lutely certain.
Even if not an act of government speech, the denial of patent protec-
tion for a moral reason is justifiable on the grounds that Congress is seek-
ing to regulate conduct—not speech—by the denial.21 The conduct that
Congress is attempting to regulate is the manufacturing, use, and sale of
embodiments of the invention. That is to say, Congress is seeking to regu-
late the actual physical things or processes invented. By denying patent
protection, then, Congress attempts to control an activity relating to the
physical thing or process. Such regulation of conduct that affects speech
implies a test under United States v. O’Brien, which Congress would likely
be able to satisfy in most cases of moral denials.22
Copyright denials, by contrast, do not constitute government speech or
regulation of conduct. Nevertheless, an exception to free speech doctrine
should apply in examining copyright denials: the limited public forum
doctrine.23 That doctrine allows the government flexibility in regulating
speech that occurs either on physical property or through an economic
resource that the government has extended to private speakers.24 As a
government resource that facilitates private speech, copyrights appear to
constitute a limited public forum, consistent with Supreme Court juris-
prudence.25 The limited public forum doctrine requires speech restric-
tions to be reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose and to be viewpoint
neutral.26 The reasonableness requirement will likely always be satisfied
18. See Ned Snow, Content-Based Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L.J. 1473, 1479–83 (2015)
(reciting Supreme Court precedent suggesting that copyright denial is a speech-suppressive
act).
19. See DANIEL BREAN & NED SNOW, PATENT LAW: FUNDAMENTALS OF DOCTRINE
AND POLICY 9 (2020).
20. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
21. See discussion infra Section II.A.3.
22. See discussion infra Section II.A.3.
23. See discussion infra Section III.A.
24. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).
25. See discussion infra Section III.A.
26. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
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because the intellectual property power gives Congress broad discretion
to select the sort of creations that will promote progress in society.27
However, the viewpoint-neutrality requirement severely limits the scope
of moral reasons for which Congress might deny copyright protection.28
Any moral reason that is related to the message of the expression or ef-
fects that are responsive to that message would be viewpoint discrimina-
tory.29 Congress, for instance, could not deny protection for statues of the
Confederacy on the ground that those statues increase racial tensions.
Congress could deny copyright protection for other content based on
moral reasons that are nonresponsive to either the message or effects of
that message. Such denials would not be viewpoint discriminatory.30 For
instance, the moral reason of encouraging lawful behavior would support
a denial of protection for content whose creation necessitated the com-
mission of a criminally violent act. The reason would apply regardless of
whether the content portrayed the criminal act, so it would be viewpoint
neutral. Hence, only a limited category of moral denials would be permis-
sible in copyright law.
This Article thus examines whether the First Amendment precludes
Congress from relying on moral reasons to withhold patent or copyright
protection for specific subject matter. It considers both the patent regime
and the copyright regime because they both arise under the same consti-
tutional clause. Their similarities and distinctions inform their respective
analyses under speech law.
Part II considers whether a denial of patent or copyright protection
would constitute a government restriction that targets private speech. It
concludes that patent denials would not constitute such a restriction, ow-
ing to doctrines relating to government speech and regulation of conduct,
but that copyright denials would. Part III considers whether the speech
restrictions that follow from copyright denials are constitutionally justifia-
ble. It argues that relatively few instances of copyright denials are consti-
tutionally justifiable if those denials are analyzed under the limited public
forum doctrine, which requires viewpoint neutrality. Part IV lastly exam-
ines whether the conclusions of this Article are consistent with free
speech case law, including the recent trademark cases of Matal v. Tam
and Iancu v. Brunetti.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON PRIVATE SPEECH
When considering whether Congress may choose not to extend intel-
lectual property protection for certain inventions or expressions, we may
not immediately recognize any problem with the freedom of speech. Why
would it matter that Congress has chosen not to patent inventions relat-
27. See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
28. See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
29. See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
30. See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
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ing to nuclear weapons31 or the human organism?32 Or that Congress
might yet deny protection for hard-core pornography? The First Amend-
ment states simply that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”33 At first glance, discouraging intellectual creations
by selectively awarding intellectual property protection might not seem to
reflect any abridgment of free speech. Indeed, a denial of protection does
not seem like a suppression of speech because the denial is merely with-
holding a benefit rather than imposing a penalty. Moreover, in the patent
context, speech may not even seem present: Congress’s denial of patent
protection seems to discourage inventions rather than speech. For many,
then, denying protection for intellectual property may seem irrelevant to
upholding the protection of free speech. However, this reasoning does
not prevail under the law. This Part explains why.
This Part thus examines whether a denial of intellectual property pro-
tection would be a restriction of free speech. More specifically, does Con-
gress restrict the speech of an author or an inventor when Congress
chooses not to extend copyright or patent protection for certain subject
matter? I consider this question separately for patent and copyright in the
two sections below. Concluding that only a denial of copyright (and not
patent) protection would be a restriction of speech, I then examine in
Part II whether the denial would be justified under the First Amendment.
A. PATENT
Courts and scholars have recognized a First Amendment tension with
patent law in the enforcement of patent rights.34 Specifically, a patentee’s
right to exclude others from making and using the subject matter of an
invention may affect others’ choices about which inventions to conceive
of and speak about. That is, enforcement of patent rights influences
others’ thoughts and speech about which inventions to make and use. Yet
what about on the incentive side? If Congress were to deny protection for
certain subject matter, would that denial cause inventors to conceive of
and speak about inventions that are different than they might otherwise
choose to conceive of and speak about? It would seem so. As discussed in
Subsection 1, inventors’ speech does appear to be affected by Congress’s
denial of patent protection. Nevertheless, for two reasons, the denial
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (“No patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or
discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic en-
ergy in an atomic weapon.”).
32. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284,
340 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (“[N]o patent may issue
on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”).
33. U.S. CONST. amend I.
34. See, e.g., Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“Most of the First Amendment concerns associated with
patent protection could be avoided if this court were willing to acknowledge that Alice
sounded the death knell for software patents.”); Dan L. Burk, Patents and the First Amend-
ment, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 197 (2018); Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99,
102 (2000); Tun-Jen Chiang, Patents and Free Speech, 107 GEO. L.J. 309 (2018).
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would not be a restriction of inventors’ speech under the First Amend-
ment. First, the government’s process of issuing patents likely constitutes
the government adopting an inventor’s speech as its own. Second, the
speech-restrictive effects of denying a patent appear to be incidental to
Congress’s purpose of regulating inventive conduct. The sections below
discuss these points.
1. The Presence of Speech
When Congress denies patent protection for certain subject matter of
inventions, the effect on speech might not be apparent. Inventions would
seem to be devices and methods that accomplish practical tasks. Consider
an example of an inventor creating a novel stovetop and receiving patent
protection for that invention; speech does not seem present in the inven-
tion of the stovetop. The invention does not seem to be a means for com-
municating thought (at least not at first glance), so there would not seem
to be any speech occurring.
This understanding is not correct. As a preliminary point, an invention
is distinct from an embodiment of the invention. As Professor Edmund
Kitch recognized in his landmark article: “[T]he invention as claimed in
the patent claims and the physical embodiment of the invention are two
quite different things. ‘A claim is an abstraction and generalization of an
indefinitely large number of concrete, physical objects.’”35 An invention
thus represents an abstraction of a physical embodiment.36 That abstrac-
tion represents an idea, and an idea constitutes knowledge.37 The inven-
tion, then, comprises the technical knowledge about how to make and use
35. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 268 (1977) (quoting PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 39 (1975)).
36. Scholars have debated how to define the boundaries of the abstraction that com-
prises the invention. Professor Oskar Liivak has argued that the invention consists of the
set of embodiments disclosed in a patent, including “a generalized embodiment that de-
fines the ‘principle of the invention.’” Oskar Liivak, Finding Invention, 40 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 57, 63 (2012). He has recognized a distinction between the invention and the actual
thing built by inventors: “some may refer to the invention or the actual invention when
they are instead referring to the actual, physical thing built by the inventors.” Id. at 65.
Professor Christopher Cotropia has argued that an invention “exists independently of the
patent document and prior to the filing of the patent application,” and this fact “requires
the inventor to conceive of the invention prior to filing.” Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is
the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1876 (2012); cf. Ted Sichelman, Commer-
cializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 356 (2010) (“[A] patent will usually disclose just
one or a few ‘embodiments’ of the invention in the patent’s specification, but will often
claim thousands of different embodiments in a claim.”); Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent
Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1211, 1228 (2012) (“The rule limit-
ing patent claims to the embodiments taught by the specification . . . would eviscerate
patent incentives.”). These interpretations contrast with actions of courts that have defined
the invention according to boundaries in the claim. See, e.g., Tex. Digit. Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
37. See generally Abstraction, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011) (defining
abstraction as “something which exists only as an idea or in theory; an abstract concept or
idea”); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 995-96 (1997) (“[The] government has created intellectual property
rights in an effort to give authors and inventors control over the use and distribution of
their ideas . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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certain subject matter—not the embodiment of that knowledge.38
This simple fact suggests that the government premises patent rights on
an inventor’s speech. Specifically, to gain patent protection, the inventor
must disclose her invention to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
and disclosure of her invention means sharing her technical knowledge.39
Disclosure does not involve providing a physical embodiment of the in-
vention to the PTO. Indeed, an inventor can receive a patent on her in-
vention without actually constructing it at all. Insofar as she discloses to
the PTO knowledge that meets the patent requirements, the government
will validate her claims to patent rights.40 Hence, the government pro-
vides patent protection for an inventor’s disclosure of knowledge, and
disclosure of knowledge is an act of speech.
An example illustrates this concept. Suppose that an inventor creates a
new type of ice-making machine. If the inventor has built the actual ice-
making machine, that physical machine is the embodiment of the inven-
tion. The invention consists of the technical knowledge about how to cre-
ate the machine and how to use it to accomplish ice-making tasks. The
patent provides the inventor rights to exclude others from making, using,
selling, and importing embodiments of the invention, i.e., actual ice-mak-
ing machines.41 Therefore, if a consumer purchases one of the actual ice-
making machines at a store, that consumer would own an embodiment of
the invention, but he would not own the invention itself nor the patent
for the invention. The invention, then, represents the technical knowl-
edge; the physical thing created represents the embodiment of that
knowledge; and the patent represents the legal right to exclude others
from engaging in actions that involve embodiments of the invention. This
is all to say that in awarding a patent, the PTO is providing a benefit in
exchange for the inventor’s disclosure of knowledge (in the example,
knowledge about how to make and use the ice-making machine).42 Ac-
38. See BREAN & SNOW, supra note 19, at 9 (“The invention is the technological
knowledge as applied to a given product, not the physical product itself.”).
39. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112.
40. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112; Nonprovisional (Utility) Patent Appli-
cation Filing Guide, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. (Jan. 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/
patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/nonprovisional-utility-pat-
ent#heading-1 [https://perma.cc/YNC3-YAXW].
41. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112; id. § 271(a) (defining rights in a patent). Admittedly,
the Patent Act does not employ this “embodiments” language; instead, it states that “who-
ever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . in-
fringes the patent.” Id. § 271(a) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the context of
embodiments—actual instantiations of the invention—seems to be implied in this statutory
language.
42. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“Every patent must describe an invention. It is part of the quid pro quo of a patent; one
describes an invention, and, if the law’s other requirements are met, one obtains a pat-
ent. . . . A description of the claimed invention allows . . . the public to understand and
improve upon the invention and to avoid the claimed boundaries of the patentee’s exclu-
sive rights.”).
Even if an inventor does not communicate her technical knowledge to anyone other
than the PTO, that is sufficient to constitute speech. Once the inventor discloses her inven-
tion to the PTO, the PTO makes the inventor’s knowledge available to the public. See
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cordingly, denying patent protection for inventions related to ice-cream
machines could affect the sort of knowledge that inventors would choose
to speak to the PTO.
2. Government Speech
Although the subsection above argues that the disclosure of inventions
to the PTO constitutes speech of inventors, it is still possible that Con-
gress’s denial of protection would not be considered an impermissible re-
striction of that speech. If Congress’s choice to extend or deny patent
rights represents a means through which Congress engages in its own
speech, adopting the private speech of inventors as its own, the First
Amendment has no application.43 So, does the denial of patent protection
represent the government choosing its own speech?
Case law suggests that the answer to this question is yes. Consider
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.44 There, a city had chosen to display in
a park a monument of the Ten Commandments, which had been donated
by a private group.45 A different organization requested permission to
erect a stone monument displaying its own religious tenets.46 After the
city denied that request, the religious organization argued that the denial
amounted to a restriction of its speech: the city had favored the Ten Com-
mandments monument of the other private group over the monument of
the religious group.47 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding
that the city had adopted the Ten Commandments monument as the city’s
own speech.48 The Court explained: “By accepting monuments that are
privately funded or donated, government entities save tax dollars and are
able to acquire monuments that they could not have afforded to fund on
their own. But while government entities regularly accept privately
funded or donated monuments, they have exercised selectivity.”49 The
Court noted that government entities long had a practice of exercising
“selective receptivity” as to the sort of monuments that it accepted.50
Like the monument that private speakers donated to the city in Pleas-
ant Grove, inventions that private speakers submit to the PTO may be
seen as speech that the government adopts (if the PTO approves the pat-
ent application). In the course of promoting the progress of useful arts,
Congress exercises selectivity in deciding which inventions it will reward.
Official Gazette for Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/
learning-and-resources/official-gazette/official-gazette-patents [https://perma.cc/EU2C-
7DGW]. Through the PTO, the inventor’s speech reaches the public. In this way, the dis-
closure process of the invention to the PTO an act of speech.
43. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 207
(2015) (“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from deter-
mining the content of what it says.”).
44. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
45. Id. at 465–66.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 466–67.
48. Id. at 470.
49. Id. at 471.
50. Id.
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The PTO denies protection for inventions that it deems unqualified for
protection according to Congress’s direction—such as inventions that are
not novel, useful, or nonobvious.51 Moreover, in the patent system, Con-
gress promotes innovative technologies by providing property rights,
which saves tax dollars that would have otherwise been necessary to sub-
sidize the research and development of those technologies. In this way,
Congress seems to adopt inventions that it deems will promote the useful
arts.
Another case instructive on this issue is Walker v. Texas Division, Sons
of Confederate Veterans.52 There, the State of Texas allowed citizens to
propose designs for specialty license plates, and the State disapproved of
the specific design of the Confederate flag.53 The Supreme Court ruled
that Texas’s issuance of design plates constituted government speech, so
the State’s denial of the design for the plate did not abridge private
speech.54 In reaching this holding, the Court applied three factors: first,
whether there exists a history of the practice by the government (the
State had long used license plates to convey messages); second, whether
an observer would ordinarily associate the speech with the government
(observers usually associate license plate designs with the State); third,
whether the government exercises control over the speech (the State di-
rectly controlled messages on its license plates).55 Together, these factors
suggested that the State had adopted the private speech on a license plate
as its own.
Applied to the patent context, these three factors suggest that Con-
gress’s decision to deny patent protection for subject matter represents a
decision not to adopt an inventor’s speech as its own. First, the govern-
ment has a long history of exercising selectivity in granting patent protec-
tion for inventions.56 It has established standards of novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility that call for content discrimination in evaluat-
ing patent applications.57 Similarly, for over 150 years, courts have denied
protection for inventions that constitute physical phenomena, natural
laws, or abstract ideas.58
Second, an observer of an issued patent appreciates that the govern-
ment has issued the patent. Although the inventor created the speech, the
issued patent signifies that the PTO has not found reason to believe an
inventor’s assertions to be invalid.59 For this reason, issued patents carry
51. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (setting forth requirements for patent protection).
52. 576 U.S. 200, 216 (2015).
53. Id. at 203.
54. Id. at 219–20.
55. Id. at 209–14.
56. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103.
57. See id.
58. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980).
59. See BREAN & SNOW, supra note 19, at 58–59.
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a stamp of government imprimatur.60
Third, the government exercises a high degree of control over patent
applications containing the inventor’s speech. Claims to the invention
must be drafted with sufficient definiteness; specifications must describe
the invention with sufficient specificity to enable an ordinary person to
make and use the invention.61 Taken together, these three factors suggest
that the government is speaking when the PTO grants patent protection
to certain subject matters of inventions.
Thus, the PTO’s decision to grant patent protection may plausibly be
understood as government speech. But this understanding is not necessa-
rily the only plausible one. Not everyone would agree that the technical
knowledge in a patented invention represents the knowledge or views of
the government.62 It is thus possible that Congress is incentivizing inven-
tors to disclose their inventions without adopting inventors’ speech as its
own. Hence, the conclusion of government speech is only a plausible
possibility.
3. Regulation of Conduct
Assuming that the government is not speaking when it issues patents,
Congress’s denial of protection appears to represent a regulation of con-
duct that has an incidental effect on speech of creators. Construed in this
way, the patent denial would not constitute an impermissible restriction
of speech. The law on regulating conduct that incidentally affects speech
is set forth in the Supreme Court case of United States v. O’Brien.63
Before reciting that law, I examine whether Congress is in fact attempting
to regulate conduct in denying patent protection for a certain subject
matter.
The conclusion that Congress is regulating conduct is based on the fact
that a denial of patent protection reduces incentives for inventors (or
licensees) to make, use, or sell embodiments of a particular invention.
Recall that an invention represents technical knowledge, an embodiment
of an invention represents the actual thing or process, and patent rights
comprise rights to control embodiments of an invention.64 A patent on an
ice-making machine, for instance, provides rights to exclude others from
making, using, and selling actual ice-making machines, which are the em-
bodiments of the technical knowledge that comprises the invention.65 So
by denying patent protection, Congress is denying inventors rights to con-
60. See id. at 39 (“In essence, a patent is just a patent application that has been ap-
proved by the government.”); see also Walker, 576 U.S. at 218 (“[E]ach specialty license
plate design is formally approved by and stamped with the imprimatur of Texas.”).
61. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112.
62. Cf. Walker, 576 U.S. at 221–22 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that a simple test to
determine whether the government is speaking is to ask whether an observer would think
that the government is expressing its views in the speech).
63. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
64. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
65. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (listing rights in a patent).
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trol invention embodiments. Without those rights, inventors are less
likely to create either the invention (the technical knowledge) or its em-
bodiments (the actual things and processes).
Because denial of patent protection decreases both the technical
knowledge and the embodiments of that knowledge, we must ask what
Congress is attempting to affect by denying patent protection—the
knowledge or the embodiments? The target of Congress’s patent denial is
likely the embodiments, i.e., the actual things and processes. That is, if
Congress were to object to the patenting of a certain device or method,
Congress would most likely be objecting to the use, manufacture, or sale
of the physical device or actual method. The device or method itself (or
its commercialization) would be deemed harmful to society—not the
knowledge about how to make or use it. Hence, the purpose of Con-
gress’s denial of patent protection would appear to be to control the pro-
duction of invention embodiments—the actual things and processes.
In support of this understanding of a patent denial, consider Congress’s
denial of protection for inventions that are directed toward the human
organism.66 Congress appears to have objected to actual human orga-
nisms being treated as property of an inventor.67 On the record, members
of Congress expressed concern that human beings could be considered
“an invention” subject to licensing for financial gain if human organisms
were patentable.68 Notably, an actual member of the human species
amounts to an embodiment of an invention. This suggests that Congress
was concerned about embodiments of the invention being subject to
property rights—not about the proliferation of technical knowledge.
The same may be said of Congress’s invalidation of tax strategies. In
2011, Congress legislated that tax strategies for reducing, avoiding, or de-
ferring tax liability lack novelty.69 The effect of the legislation is to deny
protection for tax strategies.70 This denial reflects Congress’s desire to
reduce the practice of such tax strategies. In the history leading up to the
2011 legislation, one congressman commented: “No one should have sole
ownership of how taxes are paid.”71 The congressman thus objected to
monopolizing the practice of tax strategies. Congress was concerned
about controlling conduct relating to tax strategies—not reducing speech
about those strategies.
Hence, in denying patent protection for certain subject matter, Con-
gress appears to be seeking to control the manufacture of physical things,
the practice of actual methods or processes, or the commercialization of
66. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284,
340 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (“[N]o patent may issue
on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”).
67. See Crouch, supra note 13.
68. See 157 CONG. REC. E1177-04 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (speech of Hon. Christo-
pher H. Smith).
69. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 14.
70. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102 (requiring claimed inventions to be novel).
71. See 153 CONG. REC. 23903, 23930 (2007) (statement by Rep. Boucher).
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those physical things or actual processes. This means that the patent de-
nial constitutes an attempt by Congress to regulate conduct rather than
speech. Certainly, though, Congress’s denial of patent protection would
affect the private speech of inventors. Inventors choose their speech
about technical knowledge (i.e., their inventions) according to the subject
matter for which Congress offers patent protection.72 Yet that effect on
their speech is incidental to the purpose underlying Congress’s denial of
patent protection. Congress makes its denial in order to target actions
related to the physical embodiments of the invention—not the discovery
of the technical knowledge itself or the publication of that knowledge.
Construed in this light, a moral denial of patent protection would be
subject to the standard of review in United States v. O’Brien.73 The
O’Brien Court explained that regulation of conduct that incidentally af-
fects speech is justified if the regulation: (1) “is within the constitutional
power of the Government;” (2) “furthers an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest;” (3) “is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion;” and (4) restricts free speech “no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.”74
These four elements suggest that Congress’s denial of patent protection
for immoral subject matters is justified. First, the denial would fall within
its power to promote the progress of useful arts. As discussed below in
Section III.B.2, the Intellectual Property Clause provides Congress dis-
cretion to decide which sorts of works fulfill its constitutional mandate.
Second, the government’s interest in denying patent protection for cer-
tain subject matter would likely be at least “important” based on Con-
gress’s assessment of the harms that a particular device or process poses
to society. For instance, a government interest in promoting the health
and safety of its citizens would likely support a denial of protection for
technologies leading to environmental pollution or the consumption of
illicit drugs. Third, as explained above, Congress’s denial of patent pro-
tection would be aimed at the conduct of manufacturing devices and
practicing processes—not speech. Fourth, the denial of patent protection
would still allow for inventors to engage in their speech about technical
knowledge. Although the denial of the monopoly might affect their prac-
tical means for gaining that knowledge, they would still legally be able to
do so. As a result, the restriction would not be greater than necessary to
further the interest in reducing the manufacture, practice, or commercial-
ization of an invention embodiment. Thus, Congress’s regulation of con-
duct through patent denial would, in most instances, pass the O’Brien test
for its effect on an inventor’s speech.75
72. See discussion supra Section II.A.
73. See 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
74. Id. at 377.
75. Of course, it is logically possible that Congress could deny patent protection solely
to decrease the production of technical knowledge with respect to a particular technology.
It is also logically possible that Congress could lack a substantial interest in seeking to
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In sum, denying patent protection for subject matters based on a moral
value does not appear to violate the First Amendment. As discussed
above in Section II.B.3, the denial can be viewed as Congress choosing its
own speech to adopt. If that is correct, it would negate any First Amend-
ment argument. Yet, even if patent grants are not construed as govern-
ment speech, by denying patent protection, Congress would be seeking to
control conduct relating to embodiments of an invention. In either scena-
rio (government speech or government regulation of conduct), Congress
would be justified in discriminating against the subject matter of an in-
vention that it deems to be immoral.
B. COPYRIGHT
The speech issues in denying copyright protection are very different
from those discussed above in the patent context. The three points dis-
cussed in the patent analysis above (i.e., the presence of speech, govern-
ment speech, and regulation of conduct) do not raise the same issues in
copyright. Unlike in the patent context, the presence of speech is obvious
in the copyright context; the speech at issue is not government speech;
and the government’s extension of copyright protection is not a regula-
tion of conduct. These simple points are summarily addressed in Section
II.B.1, all supporting the conclusion that Congress targets private speech
of authors when it denies copyright protection. Nevertheless, this conclu-
sion does not necessarily imply that a denial of copyright protection rep-
resents a restriction of speech. A complicating issue is whether the act of
denial constitutes a government restriction. In the words of the First
Amendment, is Congress “abridging” speech by refusing to extend the
copyright monopoly? The answer to this question is yes, although that is
not apparent to everyone. The issue is addressed in Section II.B.2.
1. Regulation of Private Speech
a. The Presence of Speech
Unlike in the patent context, the presence of protectable speech is
straightforwardly obvious in the copyright context. Copyright serves to
incentivize the creation of expression that is original and that exists in a
tangible medium.76 Quite obviously, the First Amendment protects this
sort of expression, along with speech that is not original and not in a
tangible medium.77 There is no distinction in free speech law between
publishing an original novel (copyrightable) and yelling out loud what
someone else had told you (not copyrightable). Both receive protection
regulate embodiments of certain inventions. If these situations arose, the denial would not
pass the O’Brien test. Yet, as a practical matter, these possibilities seem unlikely.
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
77. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969)
(“[T]he wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of
symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”), with Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 112, 114 (1991)
(protecting autobiographical book about criminal activity).
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as speech. Hence, potentially copyrightable expression is speech for pur-
poses of analyzing First Amendment law.78
b. Non-Government Speech
Unlike the patent grant, the copyright grant cannot be construed as the
government adopting speech as its own. For many years, Congress has
extended copyright protection for all subject matter that is original and in
a tangible medium.79 This means that there is a long history of Congress
not exercising selective receptivity of expression for the copyright grant.
With such a minimal content requirement for copyright eligibility (i.e.,
content must be original), an observer would not likely believe that the
government has stamped its imprimatur on copyrighted expression.80
Moreover, Congress has extended copyright to expression without any
requirement that the author even register the expression with the copy-
right office.81 This means that the content of copyrightable expression
may disserve the government’s own interest. Indeed, the government
need not be aware that the copyrighted expression even exists for it to
receive protection.82 This all indicates that Congress has merely set up a
system for incentivizing private speech without adopting that speech as its
own.
The Supreme Court has suggested this conclusion in the recent case of
Matal v. Tam.83 There, the Court unanimously rejected the argument that
78. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright
Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecom-
munications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 37 (2000) (“What the ‘engine of free expres-
sion’ argument means, simply enough, is that there are First Amendment interests on both
sides of a copyright case.”).
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this ti-
tle, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”); id.
§ 4 (repealed 1976) (“[T]he works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall
include all the writings of an author.”).
80. Perhaps one might argue that courts exercise control over content by deciding
whether certain works qualify as copyrightable material. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (denying copyright protection for telephone
book arrangement of names, owing to lack of originality); Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635
F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011) (denying protection for a wildflower display, owing to lack of
fixation); Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir.
2008) (denying copyright protection for digital designs of an automobile, owing to lack of
originality). However, this argument is not convincing. It reflects merely the fact that Con-
gress has set minimal requirement for eligibility. Courts deny protection only in cases
where a speaker has not met those minimal requirements. So even though there may be
many cases where courts decide the eligibility of a work, that fact does not diminish the
broad scope of content that Congress has made eligible for protection. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). The broad scope of protect-
able content—even content against the government’s interests—suggests that the govern-
ment is not speaking.
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
82. See id.
83. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017). Although part of the Court’s opinion consisted of a
plurality, all members of the Court joined Part III-A, which rejected the government-
speech argument. Id. at 1751, 1760.
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the trademark system represented government speech.84 In rejecting the
argument, the Court suggested that if it were to recognize the trademark
grant as government speech, then that could imply that the copyright
grant was also government speech.85 This implication the Court labeled
as “the most worrisome.”86 Hence, the Court has signaled that it is not
prepared to recognize the extension of copyright as government speech.
c. Regulation of Speech (Not Conduct)
When Congress denies copyright protection for certain content, Con-
gress is not regulating the conduct of authors with only an incidental ef-
fect on speech. To be sure, such a denial represents Congress attempting
to influence expression of private speakers. As contrasted with a patent
denial, a copyright denial does not represent Congress attempting to in-
fluence an author’s control over a physical embodiment of the subject
matter of thought, for a copyright does not provide its author with any
right to control such physical embodiments.87 Accordingly, when Con-
gress attempts to deny a copyright for certain expression, Congress can
only be attempting to control the expression itself.
It is also worth noting that a copyright includes rights that consist of
speech acts. Specifically, a copyright includes a right to publicly distribute
the work as well as a right to publicly perform or display the work.88 This
implies that if Congress were to deny copyright for the purpose of con-
trolling the exercise of copyright rights, Congress would be seeking to
control specific acts of speech. Hence, copyright denial cannot be viewed
as an attempt to regulate conduct. The O’Brien test discussed above in
the patent context would not apply to the copyright context.
2. An Abridgment by Congress
Does the act of denying copyright protection constitute a speech re-
striction that would fall within the meaning of “abridging the freedom of
speech” in the First Amendment?89 For many, the denial of copyright
may not seem to restrict speech because authors are still free to speak
their expression. However, the denial of copyright may present an eco-
nomic cost that influences their choice of content, and that influence trig-
gers First Amendment scrutiny. These two arguments are discussed in the
subsections below.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1760.
86. Id.
87. A copyright in a book about a marijuana device, for example, does not provide the
author any rights to control the device itself. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) (rec-
ognizing that copyright in expression does not extend to the subject matter of the
expression).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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a. Absence of Penalty
Not every act of Congress that affects speech constitutes a restriction of
speech.90 Consider the reasoning of a trademark case, In re McGinley,
decided decades ago by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.91 The
McGinley court considered whether Congress’s denial of trademark re-
gistration for “immoral” and “scandalous” speech would abridge the
speech rights of persons applying for trademark registration.92 The Mc-
Ginley court ruled that the denial was not an act of abridgment.93 In the
court’s words: “No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expres-
sion is suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights
would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.”94
From one perspective, then, the argument makes sense that denying
copyright protection would not constitute an act that restricts speech.95
Congress does not impose any penalty on a speaker when Congress re-
frains from extending that protection. If an author fails to satisfy the con-
tent-based criteria for protection, the author is not any worse off for
creating her expression. Even without a copyright, authors can still speak,
publish, and profit from their expression. The author would simply lack
rights to exclude others from making certain uses of the expression, and
those rights the author was never entitled to in the first place.96 Thus, by
denying intellectual property rights, Congress would not seem to be
abridging an author’s speech.
This view draws support from the incentive theory of intellectual prop-
erty. Under that theory, the government grants intellectual property
rights for the purpose of incentivizing the creation of otherwise under-
produced intellectual works.97 The government intervenes in the com-
mercial marketplace in order to subsidize certain creators with a
90. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998)
(ruling constitutional the government’s content-based “standards of decency and respect”
employed to decide grant applications for artistic works).
91. In re McGinley 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981), overruled by Iancu v. Brunetti, 139
S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
92. Id. at 482.
93. Id. at 484.
94. Id.
95. See Snow, supra note 18, at 1476–79 (explaining the argument that denying copy-
right is not a speech-suppressive act).
96. In the context of explaining the relationship between free speech and copyright,
Professor Edwin Baker stated:
Most importantly, the Speech Clause’s protection of individual liberty guards
a person’s right to engage in the activity of communicating, not a right to
profit from or receive economic return for the activity. . . .
. . . .
. . . Freedom of speech gives a person a right to say what she wants. It does
not give the person a right to charge a price for the opportunity to hear or
receive her speech.
C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 901, 903
(2002).
97. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13–14, 19 (2003).
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monopoly over their works.98 An implication of this theory is that by de-
nying protection for an intellectual work, the government is simply choos-
ing not to intervene in the commercial market for that work. At the same
time, the First Amendment does not compel the government to extend
artificial monopolies in any commercial market.99 Stated differently, an
author’s right to speak her intellectual creation does not imply a right to a
monopoly in the commercial marketplace for that creation. Viewed
through the framework of the incentive theory, the government’s choice
to refrain from protecting certain creations does not appear to restrict an
author’s right to speak.100
b. Economic Coercion
Although the above argument makes sense, it is not likely to prevail
under modern free speech jurisprudence. In various contexts, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that denying an economic benefit because of
speech content may coerce a speaker enough to restrict his speech. In the
Court’s words: “the government offends the First Amendment when it
imposes financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content of
their expression.”101 Under this principle, the Court has recognized a
speech restriction where the government has conditioned funding on not
speaking certain content (e.g., funding for public-broadcasting stations
conditioned on not broadcasting editorial content;102 funding for student
publications conditioned on not publishing content about religious be-
liefs;103 funding for legal-assistance organizations conditioned on re-
fraining from challenging certain policies in court;104 funding for
nongovernmental organizations conditioned on not advocating for the le-
galization of prostitution or sex-trafficking105). Similarly, the Court has
recognized speech restrictions where the government has denied or pro-
vided economic benefits based on speech content (e.g., providing prefer-
ential tax treatment to certain magazine genres;106 denying school
facilities for after-hours discussion of certain topics;107 and denying prof-
98. Id. at 20–21.
99. See generally Regan v. Tax’n with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546
(1983) (“We again reject the notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully
realized unless they are subsidized by the State.” (quoting Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959))).
100. Even though intellectual property provides its owner a market advantage over use
of the speech, the strength of that monopoly advantage is debatable. See Mark A. Lemley
& Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust
and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2104–07 (2012).
101. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
102. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 366, 400–02 (1984).
103. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 826–27.
104. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001).
105. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321,
2330–32 (2013).
106. See Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987).
107. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386, 394
(1993).
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its for books written by criminals about their own criminal activities108).
Hence, the principle is well established that negative economic conse-
quences that follow from speaking certain content are restrictions on
speech.
This principle likely applies in the copyright context. Many copyright-
able expressions require funding for their creation and distribution.109 In
the absence of copyright, authors would not realize as much revenue
from their works, so many works would simply not exist. Although the
actual effect of denying protection will depend on the particular motives
and means of an individual author, it seems certain that in many instances
the absence of the copyright monopoly will decrease speech production
and dissemination. Simply put, by denying copyright protection for cer-
tain content, Congress could achieve some speakers’ silence. For instance,
suppose that Congress denied protection for all science-fiction novels.
Even though authors could still write science-fiction novels without incur-
ring any penalty (and some probably would), some authors probably
would not. Authors who rely on book royalties for their living would
likely start writing novels in a different genre so as to realize the eco-
nomic gain that science-fiction topics no longer provide. In that way, the
denial of copyright protection would coerce their speech.
Of course, Congress need not subsidize the exercise of free speech. The
First Amendment does not require Congress to give money to authors so
that they have economic means to write a book, nor does it require Con-
gress to give money to authors’ intended audience to purchase the
book.110 Yet Congress may not use its copyright power to achieve an out-
come that Congress could not otherwise constitutionally achieve. The Su-
preme Court has noted as much, stating: “The denial of a public benefit
may not be used by the government for the purpose of creating an incen-
tive enabling it to achieve what it may not command directly.”111 Apply-
ing this principle to copyright, the question becomes whether denying
copyright protection better enables Congress to achieve an author’s si-
lence on a topic than Congress would otherwise be able to command di-
rectly (i.e., without using its copyright power).
It appears so. Suppose that Congress were to deny copyright protection
for all content. Suppose further that a profit-seeking moviemaker was
planning to create a movie about a certain subject (say, a highly violent
war movie). The absence of copyright protection for all content may or
108. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 108, 116 (1991).
109. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (“[N]o man
but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.” (quoting 3 JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL’S
LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934))); see also Tushnet, supra note 78, at 37
(“[C]opyright aids free speech because ‘[e]ffective dissemination of creative work costs
money.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Leonard W. Wang, Note, The First
Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed Test, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 1158, 1178)).
110. See generally Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546
(1983).
111. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976).
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may not result in the moviemaker creating the movie. It is possible that
she might still create it and do so with the intent to realize profit; she
might plan to protect against unauthorized distribution through a private
contract or technological encryption. Alternatively, the absence of copy-
right might completely dissuade her from creating the movie. Now sup-
pose that Congress denies copyright protection only for movies with
violent content. In that situation, is the same moviemaker just as likely to
create the violent war movie? Of course not: she would now be less likely
to create the war movie because other genres still receive copyright pro-
tection. That is, the moviemaker is less likely to create the war movie
than if no copyright protection existed at all because she can realize a
greater economic benefit by choosing a different genre. In short, by selec-
tively denying copyright, Congress imposes an opportunity cost on speak-
ers. The cost of speaking that which does not receive protection becomes
greater than speaking that which does receive protection. That opportu-
nity cost creates a stronger reason to refrain from speaking the unsub-
sidized content than if Congress were to extend copyright protection to
no content at all. Simply put, selective denial makes specific content less
attractive to speak. Congress would be using its copyright power to
achieve speakers’ silence that it could not command directly, which
amounts to a speech restriction.
The Supreme Court has recently ruled in a way that supports this con-
clusion. In Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti, the Court held that certain
content bars to trademark registration were unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.112 Although trademark is not copyright, both trade-
mark and copyright provide an economic benefit for speakers in the form
of rights to exclude others from using an expression, so the reasoning of
these trademark cases would seem applicable to copyright. In Tam, Con-
gress had barred trademark registration for marks that disparage groups,
and in Brunetti, for marks that are immoral or scandalous.113 Concluding
in both cases that Congress violated the First Amendment, the Court im-
plicitly relied on the premise that denying trademark protection consti-
tutes a restriction of speech.114 The premise straightforwardly suggests
that denying copyright protection would also be a speech-restrictive act.
Finally, although the Court has not specifically stated this conclusion
for copyright denials, the Court has repeatedly described copyright as
“the engine of free expression.”115 Indeed, the Court has portrayed copy-
right as playing a special role in furthering free speech. Because copyright
incentivizes speech, the Court views copyright as an integral part of
achieving First Amendment goals. That view, expressly adopted by the
Court, suggests that restricting specific content from receiving copyright
112. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
113. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
114. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
115. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012) (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 219 (2003)); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985).
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protection would be offensive to its interest in promoting free speech.
Under this “engine of free expression” view of copyright, restricting cop-
yright would be a restriction of speech.
Thus, denying specific content (on moral grounds or otherwise) from
receiving copyright protection appears to constitute a restriction of free
speech. Even though such a denial would not directly suppress the
speech, it would be economically coercive. Therefore, such a denial ap-
pears to be an abridgment under the First Amendment.
III. JUSTIFICATION FOR MORAL RESTRICTIONS ON
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
As discussed in Part I, restrictions on the subject matter of patent pro-
tection would not constitute restrictions of free speech within the scope of
the First Amendment. But content-based restrictions on copyright protec-
tion would. This would seem damning for the argument to restrict copy-
right protection, for no doctrine of First Amendment law is more firmly
established than the doctrine that government may not restrict speech
based on its content.116 The Supreme Court has repeatedly taught: “[A]s
a general matter, . . . government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”117 The
Court has further explained that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself of-
fensive or disagreeable.”118 The fact that society deems content undesir-
able does not give reason for the government to discriminate against it.119
Under normal rules of free speech, then, the fact that Congress finds the
content of expressive works to be objectionable cannot be the reason for
denying those works copyright protection. Normal rules of free speech
condemn such a denial.
This is not to say, though, that any restriction on copyrightable content
necessarily violates the First Amendment. Speech law recognizes that
some circumstances may justify an exception to the normal rule that con-
tent-based restrictions are unconstitutional. Whether circumstances jus-
tify such an exception often depends on which standard of review courts
employ to evaluate the restriction. A stringent standard demands that the
reason for restriction be compelling, whereas a less stringent standard is
more flexible in recognizing a permissible reason for justifying the restric-
tion. I argue below that the copyright context calls for applying the stan-
dard of review under a special speech doctrine called the limited public
forum. That standard allows for content discrimination that is reasonable
116. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91 (2011).
117. Id. at 790–91 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 535
U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
118. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118 (1991) (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990)).
119. See id.
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and that does not favor or disfavor particular viewpoints.120 In the copy-
right context, that standard suggests that Congress has limited discretion
to impose certain viewpoint-neutral moral criteria for copyright protec-
tion, but that most moral criteria would be unconstitutional.
Section III.A sets forth the argument for construing the copyright sys-
tem as a limited public forum. Section III.B considers whether moral re-
strictions on copyright eligibility would satisfy that doctrine’s first
requirement: that restrictions be reasonable. Section III.C considers
whether those moral restrictions would satisfy that doctrine’s second re-
quirement: that restrictions be viewpoint neutral. Section III.D discusses
why other standards of review should not apply
A. COPYRIGHT AS A LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM
The Supreme Court has developed a body of law that sets review stan-
dards for speech regulations that occur in the context of the government
providing physical forums or economic resources that make possible pri-
vate speech.121 The forums or resources may be physical in nature (e.g., a
library or a city hall) or they may be “metaphysical” in nature (e.g., uni-
versity resources, such as funding for a student publication).122 Insofar as
the government is extending its physical property or an economic re-
source for use by private citizens, the regulation of their private speech
on that property or through that resource may be subject to a forum
analysis.
Copyright appears to be a government resource that should be subject
to this forum analysis. In the copyright system, the government extends a
resource that results in individuals speaking. That is, Congress’s extension
of copyright protection for original expression in a tangible medium
serves to incentivize the production and dissemination of speech by pri-
vate individuals. Much speech would not exist without the copyright mo-
nopoly. Therefore, as an economic benefit that facilitates private speech,
120. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).
121. See id.; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46
(1983). From one perspective, copyright might be viewed as analogous to benefits that the
government extends as a subsidy or program. See Snow, supra note 18, at 1490–94 (arguing
that copyright may be analyzed under case law treating government subsidies that restrict
speech); cf. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2316–17 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in
part) (arguing that trademark ban for certain content could be analyzed under govern-
ment-subsidy or -program line of cases). The Court has developed a body of case law that
treats speech restrictions in that context. E.g., Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 573, 585–587 (1998) (government extended grants for furthering the arts based on
“decency and respect” criterion); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009)
(state law allows payroll deduction for payment of union dues but not political organiza-
tion). However, the plurality in Matal v. Tam opined that this line of cases applies where
the government provides “cash subsidies or their equivalent.” 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1761 (2017)
(plurality opinion). On that ground, the Court distinguished those cases from Congress
denying trademark protection to certain content. Id. For this reason expressed in Tam, the
cases do not seem applicable to a content-based denial of copyright protection.
122. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (recognizing university funding as “a forum more
in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense”).
186 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
copyright appears to be a sort of metaphysical forum.123
This conclusion matters because, in the forum speech analysis, some
types of forums apply a standard of review that is more lenient than the
normal standard of strict scrutiny (discussed below in Section III.D). As I
argue below, the copyright system reflects the specific forum called the
limited public forum. The subsections below examine the various forums
and argue that copyright should be analyzed as a limited public forum.
1. Types of Forums
The Court has outlined four types of forums relevant to content regula-
tion of speech.124 Two are very similar, so I address them first together.
The first one is the traditional public forum. The Court has defined tradi-
tional public forums as “places which by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”125 That forum allows
citizens to assemble and freely communicate their thoughts about any
subject; it would include such places as a public park, street corner, or
public square.126 Its traditional nature suggests that it is usually a physical
forum.127 The second type of forum is the designated public forum, which
“consists of public property which the state has opened for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity.”128 Like the traditional public
forum, the designated public forum exists for citizens to assemble and
communicate their thoughts about any subject. An example would be a
city building that has been designated for the public to speak about any
subject. Under either of these forums, government restrictions of speech
are subject to a stringent review standard—strict scrutiny—which is dis-
cussed in Section III.D.129
These first and second types of forums are distinguishable from the
copyright context, and for the same reason. Copyright does not exist to
enable citizens to freely communicate thoughts about any subject matter.
It exists to promote speech that effectuates the progress of science and is
creative.130 Deceitful speech and unoriginal speech, for instance, do not
123. See Snow, supra note 18, at 1487–89 (arguing that copyright falls with the limited
public forum doctrine).
124. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–47. For a concise statement on the law of public forums,
see Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1979–92 (2011).
125. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
126. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title
of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”).
127. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
128. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
129. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
130. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors,
but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); id. at 347 (describing originality or creativity as “the
touchstone of copyright protection”).
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fulfill the purpose of copyright.131 Hence, because the constitutional di-
rective of copyright concerns the subject matter of speech, the traditional
or designated public forums cannot apply to intellectual property.132
The third forum is the nonpublic forum. This is a forum that the gov-
ernment owns or controls for a purpose that is not public communication
by private speakers.133 An example is a military installation, which exists
to train soldiers rather than to facilitate speech by private members of the
public.134 Here again, copyright does not fit this sort of forum because
copyright exists specifically to facilitate speech by private members of the
public.135 As the “engine of free expression,” the copyright system cannot
be a nonpublic forum.136
The fourth and final forum is the limited public forum. The limited
public forum represents a forum created “for a limited purpose such as
use by certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain subjects.”137 In
this way, the purpose of the forum inherently limits the forum to certain
speakers or to the discussion of certain subject matters. The Court has
explained: “The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legiti-
131. For further explanation on reasons why deceitful speech falls outside the scope of
the Intellectual Property Clause, see Ned Snow, Intellectual Property and Immorality
164–77 (Mar. 8, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that deceit-
ful and pornographic expression fall outside the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause).
Relatedly, Professor Cathay Smith has persuasively argued that the factual estoppel doc-
trine should apply where an author holds out false statements as factually true, consistent
with the practice of some courts. See Cathay Y.N. Smith, Truth, Lies, and Copyright, 20
NEV. L.J. 201 (2019).
132. One scholar has argued that copyright should be construed as either a traditional
or designated public forum for the reason that “[a]nyone can access the copyright system.”
See Alfred C. Yen, Rethinking Copyright’s Relationship to the First Amendment, 100 B.U.
L. REV. 1215, 1256 (2020). Although it is true that anyone can access the copyright system,
this fact alone does not imply a public forum. In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, the Court recognized that a traditional or designated public forum does
not exist where the state “reserve[s] the forum for its intended purposes.” 460 U.S. 37,
45–46 (1983) (“[T]he state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communica-
tive or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”). Again in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court made clear that
where a purpose of a forum dictates discussion of certain topics, the forum is not a tradi-
tional or designated public forum. 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (explaining a limited public
forum as occurring where “[the] limited and legitimate purposes for which [a forum] was
created . . . justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain
topics”). Application of this simple principle to the copyright context implies that copy-
right should not be construed as a public forum: the government necessarily reserves copy-
right for the purpose specified in the Progress Provision of the Intellectual Property
Clause—“[t]o promote the Progress of Science.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. That Provi-
sion calls for discussion of content that will not impede the realization of that purpose.
Hence, a traditional or designated public forum would not be the correct classification for
the copyright system.
133. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
134. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (“[T]he business of a military installa-
tion . . . [is] to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.”).
135. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012) (describing copyright as “the engine of
free expression” (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003))); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (same).
136. See supra note 135.
137. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
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mate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving
it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”138 An exam-
ple is the resources of a university.139 The Court has observed that a “uni-
versity differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or
parks or even municipal theaters.”140 Recognizing the educational mis-
sion of a university, the Court has allowed universities “to impose reason-
able regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus
and facilities.”141
From a descriptive standpoint, the limited public forum lines up well
with copyright. Like a university, copyright exists to encourage discussion
of topics that will promote knowledge, learning, and the fruits thereof.142
Stated differently, copyright exists to promote original speech that ad-
vances knowledge and its fruits.143 This purpose thereby limits the sort of
speech that the resources of copyright may incentivize, and accordingly, it
justifies Congress in reserving copyright for the discussion of certain sub-
jects. In short, copyright is not a forum that exists to encourage any and
all speech. The Intellectual Property Clause sets forth the specific pur-
pose of encouraging a certain sort of speech, i.e., that which “promote[s]
the Progress of Science.”144 The Clause suggests that copyright should be
viewed as a limited public forum.
2. Reasons for Copyright as a Limited Public Forum
In addition to the descriptive basis for construing copyright as a limited
public forum, other reasons support this conclusion. The Intellectual
Property Clause implies discretionary authority for Congress to decide
which intellectual creations may receive copyright and patent protec-
tion.145 If the First Amendment were interpreted to imply a standard of
review that precludes Congress from making those judgments in the
copyright domain, Congress could not exercise that discretionary author-
ity under the Clause with respect to copyright. Yet general constitutional
canons of interpretation call for interpreting clauses consistently if possi-
ble.146 And an interpretation that respects both the First Amendment and
138. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
139. See, e.g., id. at 874–75 (funding of student activities related to the educational pur-
pose of the university); Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 668–69 (2010) (funding of student organization).
140. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
829 (funding of student activities related to the educational purpose of the university);
Martinez, 561 U.S. at 668 (funding of student organization).
141. Id.
142. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra Section III.A.1.
143. See Snow, supra note 18, at 1491.
144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
145. See Snow, supra note 131, at 179–89 (interpreting Intellectual Property Clause as
providing Congress discretion to judge which works promote the progress of science);
Snow, supra note 18, at 1491 (same).
146. See generally Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 570–71 (1840) (“In expounding the
Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate
meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used,
or needlessly added.”).
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the Clause appears possible: neither the freedom of speech nor the power
to discretionarily grant copyright protection are absolute doctrines that
lack any flexibility. Doctrines of free speech can protect against the gov-
ernment suppressing ideas while still maintaining some of the discretion
that the Clause reserves for Congress to grant or deny protection. The
limited public forum is such a speech doctrine that allows flexibility in
application, preserving some discretion for Congress while also ensuring
significant speech protection.
A second reason for construing copyright as a limited public forum lies
in the fact that the means of restricting speech is through extending a
subsidy rather than imposing a penalty. The Supreme Court relied on this
rationale to apply the limited public forum doctrine in Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez.147 There, a student organization, the Christian Legal
Society (CLS), sought to exclude students from its organization based on
homosexual conduct or religious beliefs.148 Because of these exclusions,
Hastings Law School refused to give CLS official recognition as a student
organization, which made CLS ineligible for a variety of privileges (e.g.,
funding, facility use).149 At issue was whether CLS’s right to speak its
views on homosexual conduct and religion, so as to exclude members
from joining, precluded Hastings from denying the benefit of official rec-
ognition as a student organization.150 In deciding this question, the Court
applied a limited public forum analysis. The Court explained that one
reason for applying the limited public forum was that the speech restric-
tion took the form of a subsidy rather than a prohibition.151 The Court
explained:
[T]his case fits comfortably within the limited-public-forum category,
for CLS, in seeking what is effectively a state subsidy, faces only indi-
rect pressure to modify its membership policies; CLS may exclude
any person for any reason if it forgoes the benefits of official
recognition. . . .
In diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished between poli-
cies that require action and those that withhold benefits. Application
of the less restrictive limited-public-forum analysis better accounts
for the fact that Hastings, through its [student organization] pro-
gram, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of
prohibition.152
Simply put, because the absence of an economic subsidy poses a restric-
tion on speech that is less forceful than a criminal or civil penalty, a less
demanding standard of review is appropriate.
This principle suggests that the limited public forum is an appropriate
framework for denials of copyright protection. The copyright denial rep-
147. 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
148. Id. at 672.
149. Id. at 669–70.
150. Id. at 678–80.
151. Id. at 682.
152. Id. at 682–83 (citations omitted).
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resents an absence of an economic subsidy that only indirectly restricts
speech: speakers can still speak and even profit from uncopyrighted con-
tent.153 Accordingly, the fact that speech restrictions under copyright re-
present an indirect means for bringing about silence suggests that free
speech should allow the government some degree of content-based dis-
cretion in employing its copyright power. For this reason, the limited pub-
lic forum appears to be the appropriate framework.
A third reason is that some Justices of the Court have indicated that
the limited public forum may be the correct framework for speech restric-
tions in trademark law. Given that trademark and copyright both facili-
tate private speech through the extension of exclusive rights, the Justices’
comments are instructive on whether the limited public forum applies in
the copyright context. As discussed above, the Court recently decided
Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti, both of which addressed whether
certain content bars to trademark registration constitute speech abridg-
ments.154 In neither case did the Court rule on which standard of review
should apply, for in both cases, the content bars were held to be view-
point discriminatory, and viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional
under any review standard.155 Yet in Tam, Justice Samuel Alito suggested
that the limited public forum could be the correct framework for evaluat-
ing the content bars. After rejecting arguments for construing the trade-
mark system under other speech frameworks, Justice Alito wrote the
following for a plurality of the Court:
 Potentially more analogous [to the present case] are cases in which
a unit of government creates a limited public forum for private
speech. When government creates such a forum, in either a literal or
“metaphysical” sense, some content- and speaker-based restrictions
may be allowed. However, even in such cases, what we have termed
“viewpoint discrimination” is forbidden.156
153. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.a (explaining the argument that denial of copy-
right protection does not suppress speech).
154. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
155. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2298–99 (“The eight-Justice Court [in Tam] divided evenly
between two opinions and could not agree on the overall framework for deciding the
case. . . . But all the Justices agreed on two propositions. First, if a trademark registration
bar is viewpoint-based, it is unconstitutional. And second, the disparagement bar was view-
point-based.”); Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205,
220–21 (2013) (finding viewpoint discrimination under review standard for government-
subsidy program); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565, 572 (2011) (applying inter-
mediate scrutiny to find First Amendment violation based on speech regulations “aimed at
a particular viewpoint”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (applying
strict scrutiny to strike down ordinance as viewpoint discriminatory); Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (finding viewpoint discrimination
under limited public forum doctrine).
The government may choose a viewpoint in choosing its own speech. See Walker v. Tex.
Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 200, 207 (2015) (“When government speaks,
it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.”).
156. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (citations omitted).
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Alito thus opened the door to the possibility that the limited public forum
doctrine governs evaluation of content-based bars to trademark
protection.
In Brunetti, two Justices contemplated that the limited public forum
could be the correct framework.157 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Stephen Breyer stated: “[O]ne can find some vague resemblance between
trademark registration and what this Court refers to as a ‘limited public
forum’ created by the government for private speech.”158 Justice Sonia
Sotomayor opined a similar sentiment when describing the system of
trademark registration:
 When the Court has talked about governmental initiatives like this
one before, it has usually used one of two general labels. In several
cases, the Court has treated such initiatives as a limited public (or
nonpublic) forum. In other situations, the Court has discussed similar
initiatives as government programs or subsidies. In each of these sit-
uations, a governmental body established an initiative that supported
some forms of expression without restricting others. Some speakers
were better off, but no speakers were worse off.
Regardless of the finer distinctions between these labels, reasona-
ble, viewpoint-neutral content discrimination is generally permissible
under either framework.159
Thus, Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Alito (who was writing for
Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer) have each signaled that the trade-
mark system may be a limited public forum. This signaling supports con-
struing the analogous intellectual property regime of copyright under that
framework as well.
3. Criticisms of Copyright as a Limited Public Forum
Despite these reasons for construing copyright as a limited public fo-
rum, there are reasons to disagree. Professor Alfred Yen has introduced
three reasons to doubt the application of the limited public forum doc-
trine to copyright law.160 First, he argues that the limited public forum
doctrine exists for the government “to manage its own property and oper-
ations.”161 Second, he contends that applying the doctrine to copyright
157. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2305 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 2316 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 2305 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated the following on poten-
tially applying a public-forum analysis to trademark restrictions:
 What about the concept of a “public forum”? Trademark registration has
little in common with a traditional public forum, as the register of trade-
marks is not a public park, a street, or a similar forum for public debate. But
one can find some vague resemblance between trademark registration and
what this Court refers to as a “limited public forum” created by the govern-
ment for private speech.
Id. (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 2316–17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
160. Yen, supra note 132, at 1256–57.
161. Id. at 1256.
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would enable Congress “to hinder a disfavored form of expression under
the guise of promoting the progress of art.”162 Third, he argues that ap-
plying the doctrine whenever legislation subsidizes speech would invali-
date many precedents that apply a more stringent standard of review.163
Each of these reasons merits discussion.
On the first reason, I do not disagree that the limited public forum
doctrine exists for the government to manage its own property and opera-
tions. Yet the meaning of “operations” (Yen’s term) must encompass
more than activities on physical property. The Court has applied the lim-
ited public forum doctrine when the government extends economic re-
sources to private speakers.164 In the copyright domain, Congress’s
operation is to promote the progress of science, and selectively extending
the economic resource of a copyright monopoly is the constitutionally
designated means for doing so. That is, Congress’s operation under the
Intellectual Property Clause is to promote advancements in knowledge
and learning; to manage that operation, Congress must be able to control
how it bestows copyrights.165 Therefore, the constitutional directive in the
Clause implies that Congress must manage its operation of the copyright
power, and the limited public forum enables Congress to fulfill that role.
On the second reason, I respectfully disagree that the limited public
forum doctrine would make it too easy for Congress to hinder a disfa-
vored form of expression. The limited public forum exclusion of view-
point-discriminatory restrictions places a significant restraint on
Congress’s ability to deny protection. As I discuss in Section III.B, the
Court in Brunetti and Tam clarified the meaning of viewpoint discrimina-
tion in a way that expanded its breadth of coverage. Essentially, if a con-
tent-based denial exists because Congress is disagreeing with or
responding to an idea or message within the content, the denial would
amount to viewpoint discrimination.166 Suppose, for instance, that Con-
gress were to deny protection for depictions of teen drug use on the basis
that the content does not promote progress.167 Congress would be re-
sponding to the idea of teen drug use, which is a message within the con-
tent, so the denial would be viewpoint discriminatory. Hence, the limited
162. Id. at 1257.
163. Id. at 1256.
164. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669, 682 (2010) (applying forum analysis for economic privileges
of student-group registration); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 822–23, 830 (1995) (applying forum analysis of funding for student publication); Perry
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–47 (1983) (applying forum
analysis of a school mail system).
165. Of course, if one interprets the “Progress of Science” as providing Congress only
the power to promote all content, then the argument is much weaker: Congress need not
be able to select which content to subsidize in order to manage its operation of promoting
all content. Thus, my contrary view on this first reason depends on the meaning of the
Progress Provision.
166. See discussion infra Section III.C.
167. But see Yen, supra note 132, at 1257 (suggesting that Congress could deny protec-
tion for teen drug-use depiction under the limited public forum).
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public forum’s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination would keep Con-
gress from denying protection on the basis that an idea or message within
the content fails to promote progress. The reach of Congress would be
severely limited.
That said, in discerning between viewpoint-neutral discrimination and
viewpoint-based discrimination, the Court has recognized that “the dis-
tinction is not a precise one.”168 As a result, this second reason for ob-
jecting to the limited public forum should not be ignored. Without broad
application of the viewpoint-discrimination doctrine, Congress could dis-
favor specific ideas within content, which would effectively transform the
Intellectual Property Clause into a license to violate a core tenet of free
speech. That must not occur. Accordingly, the Court must apply the view-
point-discrimination exclusion liberally, much like it did in Brunetti and
Tam.
Yen’s third reason is that applying the limited public forum doctrine
whenever legislation subsidizes speech would invalidate precedents that
apply a more stringent standard of review, i.e., the strict scrutiny stan-
dard.169 This conclusion appears to assume that the basis for applying the
limited public forum doctrine to the copyright context is the sole fact that
copyright subsidizes speech. Certainly that fact is relevant, but it is not
the only reason for applying the doctrine in this context. Once again, the
Intellectual Property Clause implies authority for Congress to choose
which content will promote progress. The Clause therefore calls for the
application of a speech doctrine through which Congress may exercise
discretion to deny specific content (although not based on any idea within
that content). Copyright, then, is especially different from precedents ap-
plying strict scrutiny: the basis for the discrimination in copyright derives
from the Constitution itself—not only from the fact that legislation subsi-
dizes speech.170
168. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
169. Yen, supra note 132, at 1256–57 (“If courts begin to characterize general legislation
that selectively subsidizes speech as a limited public forum, the result will be invalidation
of many precedents applying strict scrutiny to content-based regulation.” (citing Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), and Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 234 (1987), as examples of precedents that could be invalidated)).
170. For example, in Arkansas Writers’ Project, the Court applied strict scrutiny to
strike down a state statute that exempted certain content from a sales tax on magazines.
481 U.S. at 234 (“[The state] has advanced no compelling justification for selective, con-
tent-based taxation of certain magazines, and the tax is therefore invalid under the First
Amendment.”). The effect of the tax was to subsidize certain categories of content that
were not subject to the tax, or in other words, the State had legislated a content-based
subsidy. However, the State had not enacted its content-based scheme under authority
from the federal Constitution. Unlike in the copyright context, there was no constitutional
authority for the State in Arkansas Writers’ Project to exercise content discrimination.
Therefore, the argument for applying the limited public forum doctrine would not be
nearly as strong in that case as in the copyright context.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, is another case that has been cited as one that
would be decided differently if the copyright context were viewed under the limited public
forum doctrine. See Yen, supra note 132, at 1257. In Reed, a town adopted a code that
governed the manner in which people could display outdoor signs, and in particular, direc-
tional signs relating to qualifying events. Reed, 576 U.S. at 159. The Court applied strict
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B. REASONABLENESS OF MORAL RESTRICTIONS
Having concluded that copyright should be viewed as a limited public
forum, we now examine that forum’s standard of review for evaluating
moral restrictions on copyright eligibility. Speech restrictions in a limited
public forum must meet two conditions: first, the restrictions must be rea-
sonable in light of the forum’s purpose; and second, the restrictions must
be viewpoint neutral.171 This Section examines the first requirement of
reasonableness.
1. Court Statements on Reasonableness
The Supreme Court has stated the reasonableness requirement in its
general description of the limited public forum doctrine. In Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court stated:
The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate
purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it
for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics. Once it has
opened a limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude speech where
its distinction is not “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum,” nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its
viewpoint.172
Once the government creates a forum for a purpose, the government is
bound by that purpose as to the speech that may be restricted in the fo-
rum. For this reason, the reasonableness of a speech restriction is assessed
in relation to the forum’s purposes. Correlatively, the purposes of a fo-
rum must be “limited and legitimate.”173 The Court, however, has never
explicated criteria for determining whether a purpose is limited and
legitimate.
The Court provided further explanation on the meaning of reasonable-
ness in another case, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
scrutiny to strike down the code. Id. at 172. Important to this discussion is the fact that the
code reflected a zoning regulation; it did not provide any sort of economic subsidy for
speech. Hence, Reed would not be decided any differently even if the test for whether to
apply the limited public forum doctrine was the presence of an economic subsidy for
speech.
171. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995)
(“Thus, in determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has
created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinc-
tion between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permissible if it pre-
serves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint
discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise
within the forum’s limitations.”).
172. Id. at 829 (citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804–06); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (“In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state
may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as
the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” (emphasis added)).
173. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
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tional Fund, Inc., which concerns a speech restriction in a “nonpublic”
forum.174 Although Cornelius is not a limited public forum case, the non-
public forum test imposes the same criteria for speech restrictions (rea-
sonableness and viewpoint neutrality); hence, the Court’s explanation of
reasonableness in Cornelius would appear to apply to the limited public
forum.175 The Cornelius Court observed:
The Government’s decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum
need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation. In contrast to a public forum, a finding of
strict incompatibility between the nature of the speech or the iden-
tity of the speaker and the functioning of the nonpublic forum is not
mandated.176
In the quotation, the Court signaled that the reasonableness require-
ment should be applied flexibly. The requirement does not mean “the
most reasonable or the only reasonable” restriction.177 Furthermore, the
nature of the speech being restricted need not be strictly incompatible
with the purpose of the forum. In short, the requirement of reasonable-
ness preserves discretion for the government to assess whether a category
of speech will fulfill the forum’s purpose.
2. Reasonableness of Moral Restrictions on Copyright Eligibility
As discussed above, the reasonableness standard requires that the pur-
pose of the forum be both “legitimate” and “limited.”178 The purpose of
the copyright forum is to promote the progress of science, or in other
words, to further knowledge and its fruits.179 That this purpose is legiti-
mate cannot be doubted given that it derives from the Constitution.180
That this purpose is limited, though, may not be immediately apparent. If
one construes “the Progress of Science” as having no limiting effect on
Congress, the purpose of copyright’s forum would be unlimited in nature,
allowing Congress to discriminate among content for any reason at all.
Under this erroneous construction of the Intellectual Property Clause,
Congress could discriminatorily grant or deny copyright protection in or-
der to further any purpose, regardless of its effect on promoting the pro-
gress of science. Without a meaningful purpose, granting copyright to
reward certain campaign contributors or to favor certain segments of the
economy would be reasonable. But Congress cannot exercise its powers
under the Intellectual Property Clause for such purposes.181 The purpose
174. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808–09 (1985).
175. Id. at 806 (“Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”).
176. Id. at 808.
177. Id.
178. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829
179. See supra note 145.
180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
181. See Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indiffer-
ence to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that “the
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of promoting the progress of science limits Congress to enact only legisla-
tion that furthers the public store of knowledge and its fruits. The forum
of copyright is therefore limited.
Although the progress of science represents a limited purpose, the pur-
pose is nevertheless broad in scope. As I have written elsewhere, the In-
tellectual Property Clause provides Congress authority to make
reasonable judgments in fulfilling its constitutional purpose of promoting
the progress of science.182 Put simply, Congress has discretion to deny
protection for that which it reasonably believes will not promote pro-
gress, meaning expression that can reasonably be understood to cause
harmful consequences.183 Moreover, according to the language quoted
above from Cornelius, a restriction may still be reasonable even if the
subject matter of the restriction is not entirely incompatible with the pur-
pose of the forum. So, the fact that a subject of content (say, libelous
content) may promote some knowledge (say, knowledge about
fabricating news accounts) does not necessarily mean that denying that
subject is unreasonable. The reasonableness requirement would not be
difficult to satisfy.
C. VIEWPOINT ANALYSIS OF MORAL RESTRICTIONS
Assuming that Congress’s denial of copyright protection would usually
be reasonable under its broad discretionary authority of the Intellectual
Property Clause, the application of the limited public forum doctrine to
intellectual property comes down to the second requirement—Congress’s
restriction must be viewpoint neutral. The effect of the First Amendment
on Congress’s copyright power would thus amount to a prohibition of
viewpoint-discriminatory criteria. Therefore, the inquiry into viewpoint
discrimination is critically important to the speech analysis. It is the
speech analysis.
1. Law on Viewpoint Discrimination
The Supreme Court has explained that viewpoint discrimination occurs
when the government “give[s] one side of a debatable public question an
advantage in expressing its views to the people.”184 This definition might
suggest that viewpoint discrimination has a narrow application, occurring
only in situations where the government restricts speech that overtly
prescribes a position on a debatable issue—for instance, restricting
speech that specifically advocates in favor of gun control. In application,
Progress of Science” of the Intellectual Property Clause limits Congress’s copyright
power).
182. See Ned Snow, Discrimination in the Copyright Clause, 67 ALA. L. REV. 583, 592
(2016).
183. See Snow, supra note 131, at 179–89, 225 (arguing that Congress may deny protec-
tion for expression that results in harmful outcomes for society, insofar as the criteria for
denial are viewpoint neutral).
184. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 483 (2014) (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994)).
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however, the meaning of viewpoint discrimination is anything but simple
or narrow. Viewpoint discrimination occurs where the government’s rea-
son for restricting speech is a speaker’s message, opinion, ideology, or
perspective. It also occurs where that reason is to restrict all viewpoints
on an issue (not just a specific viewpoint). Lastly, it occurs where the
government’s reason for the restriction is to prevent a harmful effect that
follows from the message in the speech. The subsections below explain
these points.
a. Speaker Viewpoint as a Rationale for the Restriction
The inquiry into viewpoint discrimination necessarily examines why the
government is restricting speech.185 The meaning of “viewpoint” is broad:
the Court has explained that viewpoint includes “the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.”186 The Court has
also described viewpoint as the “message” within the content.187 Hence,
if the government’s rationale for restricting the speech is a disagreement
with the opinion, perspective, ideology, or message of the content, the
restriction is viewpoint discriminatory.
Two cases with opposing conclusions demonstrate viewpoint-discrimi-
natory and viewpoint-neutral rationales for content discrimination. In
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, a univer-
sity refused to fund student publications that “promote[d] or manifest[ed]
a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”188 The Court
held that the reason for imposing the restriction was to target the stu-
dents’ viewpoints about the existence of a deity or an ultimate reality.189
In the Court’s words: “[the university] selects for disfavored treatment
those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.”190
The rationale for the restriction—disagreement with the expression of
specific viewpoints—demonstrated that the restriction was viewpoint
discriminatory.
By contrast, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a law school
adopted a policy that conditioned recognition of student-organization sta-
tus on allowing any and all students to become a member. This “all com-
ers” policy prevented students from speaking their viewpoints; in
particular, the plaintiff student organization, Christian Legal Society
(CLS), could not speak their views on homosexual conduct or religious
beliefs as a basis for excluding students from membership.191 Neverthe-
less, the Court held the policy to be viewpoint neutral.192 According to
185. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829, 831 (1995)
(defining the viewpoint inquiry as an examination into “the rationale for the restriction”).
186. See id.
187. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299–2300 (2019).
188. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825, 827 (1995) (alteration in original).
189. Id. at 831.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 672–73.
192. Id. at 694–95.
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the Court, the law school’s rationale for its all-comers policy was “‘to
redress th[e] perceived harms’ of exclusionary membership policies . . .
[rather than] mere disagreement with [any student group’s] beliefs or bi-
ases.”193 The Court pointed out that this reason for the restriction was
different than the restriction in Rosenberger because the law school was
targeting effects of the conduct of excluding students from membership,
as contrasted with the university’s targeting religious viewpoints in
Rosenberger.194 In other words, the reason for restricting speech in
Martinez related to the conduct of CLS (specifically, the act of excluding
students from membership)—not any viewpoint of CLS (specifically, its
religious views). The restriction was therefore viewpoint neutral.
What about a restriction of a general category of speech? The answer is
that whether a restriction on a general category is viewpoint discrimina-
tory depends on the reason for the restriction. If the reason is to restrict
certain viewpoints (or all viewpoints) that fall within the general cate-
gory, the restriction is viewpoint discriminatory.195 If the reason does not
relate to the viewpoints within that category, then the restriction is view-
point neutral. Thus, whether a restriction on a general category of speech
is viewpoint discriminatory comes down to whether the government is
seeking to silence multiple viewpoints, or instead, is furthering a reason
that is distinct from any viewpoint in the content.
The Court’s recent trademark cases mentioned above, Matal v. Tam
and Iancu v. Brunetti, exemplify this principle.196 Recall that in Tam,
Congress had barred registration of marks that could “disparage”
others,197 and in Brunetti, Congress had barred registration of marks that
were “scandalous” or “immoral.”198 None of these bars singled out spe-
cific viewpoints: they neither prevented disparagement of specific people
nor prevented specific immoral or scandalous views. Hence, from one
perspective, the bars in Tam and Brunetti seemed viewpoint neutral be-
cause they applied to general categories of speech. Nevertheless, both the
Tam and Brunetti Courts held these bars to be viewpoint discrimina-
tory.199 The Court explained that Congress was targeting all viewpoints
within the respective categories of content.200 The upshot is that view-
point discrimination occurs when the government targets messages within
content, regardless of whether the messages consist of a single viewpoint,
193. Id. at 696 (first and third alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476, 488 (1993)).
194. Id. at 694–96.
195. Id. at 829, 831 (“If the topic of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of
several views on that problem is just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of
only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic perspective on the
debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, or social
viewpoint.”).
196. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
197. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751
198. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297.
199. Id. at 2299; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion).
200. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299–2301; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion).
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many viewpoints, or even contradictory viewpoints.201
b. Speech Effects as a Rationale for the Restriction
Suppose that the government restricts speech because of the effects
that follow from the speech, rather than a disagreement with the view-
point within the speech. Does that rationale for restricting the speech im-
ply that the discrimination is viewpoint neutral? Not necessarily. If the
reason for the restriction is the listener’s reaction to a message in the
speech, that reason is viewpoint discriminatory. As Justice Kennedy ex-
plained, “a speech burden based on audience reactions is simply govern-
ment hostility and intervention in a different guise. The speech is
targeted, after all, based on the government’s disapproval of the
speaker’s choice of message.”202
The case of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul further enforces this teaching.203
In R.A.V., a city ordinance penalized persons who placed a burning cross
on property with knowledge that the act would arouse anger, alarm, or
resentment in others on the basis of race or color.204 The city argued that
the ordinance was constitutional because it targeted only the effects of
the speech (i.e., viewers’ emotional responses to a burning cross).205 Re-
jecting this argument, the Court explained that “[l]isteners’ reactions to
speech,” and in particular “the emotive impact of speech on its audi-
ence,” would not count as a permissible justification.206 The restriction
was viewpoint discriminatory.207
Another case that applied this principle is Agency for International De-
velopment v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.208 There, Con-
gress had funded nongovernmental organizations on the condition that
none of their programs would promote the legalization of prostitution or
sex trafficking.209 The condition for the funding represented an attempt
to prevent harmful effects (the actual activities of prostitution and sex
trafficking) that follow from the viewpoint that prostitution and sex traf-
ficking should be legal. As harmful as those effects are, the Court held
that the condition was viewpoint discriminatory.210 Listeners’ actions in
response to the viewpoint was not a permissible reason for the restriction.
Hence, if the reason for restricting the speech constitutes a listener’s re-
sponse to the message of the speech, the reason is viewpoint
discriminatory.
201. Part IV further discusses these cases.
202. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
203. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
204. Id. at 380.
205. Id. at 394.
206. Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 334 (1988)).
207. Id. at 391.
208. 570 U.S. 205 (2013).
209. Id. at 208.
210. Id. at 220–21.
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On the other hand, if the reason for copyright denial is an effect of the
speech that is not based on a viewpoint or a response to a viewpoint in
the message, that reason would be viewpoint neutral. Consider the Marti-
nez case, discussed in the subsection above, where the law school condi-
tioned its recognition of student-organization status on an all-comers
policy.211 The Court explained that the condition existed because “[the
law school] ‘desire[d] to redress th[e] perceived harms’ of exclusionary
membership policies.”212 The reason for the restriction was the “per-
ceived harms,” which is an effect of speech (i.e., the effect of telling stu-
dents that they cannot join the group). Yet the Court was careful to point
out that the perceived harms did not follow from any viewpoint in CLS’s
speech at issue (i.e., CLS’s views on homosexual conduct or its religious
beliefs). Rather, the perceived harms followed from the act of barring the
students from joining the group.213 In other words, the Court noted that
the perceived harms followed from the conduct of denying membership
and not from the students’ perspective or views that would lead to the
denial.214 Because the effects of the speech (i.e., the perceived harms)
were not directly related to any specific views of the student organization,
they were viewpoint neutral.
Other speech-forum cases illustrate this principle. In Perry Education
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, a school board excluded all but
one union from communicating with teachers via an interschool mail sys-
tem for teachers.215 In a forum analysis, the Court held that the preferen-
tial treatment of the union was viewpoint neutral because the reason for
its exclusive use of the mail system was that the union had been elected
the exclusive bargaining representative for teachers.216 Importantly, the
Court also approved another reason for excluding rival unions—the ex-
clusion prevented schools “from becoming a battlefield for inter-union
squabbles.”217 This other reason reflects a potential negative effect of the
speech at issue: the speech could create an environment ripe for articulat-
ing disputes between unions and that effect would be inconsistent with
the purpose of the teachers’ mail system. Because that potential effect
was not specific to any message by any union, it was viewpoint neutral.
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the
nonpublic forum case mentioned above, the government had excluded
certain organizations from participating in a charity campaign aimed at
211. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Marti-
nez, 561 U.S. 661, 672–73 (2010).
212. Id. at 696 (third alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,
488 (1993)).
213. Id. (“The Law School’s policy aims at the act of rejecting would-be group members
without reference to the reasons motivating that behavior . . . . CLS’s conduct—not its
Christian perspective—is, from [the law school’s] vantage point, what stands between the
group and RSO status.” (citation omitted)).
214. Id.
215. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983).
216. Id. at 49.
217. Id. at 52 (quoting Haukedahl v. Sch. Dist. No. 108, No. 75-C-3641 (N.D. Ill. May
14, 1976)).
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federal employees.218 The Court noted acceptable rationales for the ex-
clusion of those organizations’ speech:
We conclude that the Government does not violate the First
Amendment when it limits participation in the [charity campaign] in
order to minimize disruption to the federal workplace, to ensure the
success of the fund-raising effort, or to avoid the appearance of polit-
ical favoritism without regard to the viewpoint of the excluded
groups.219
Like the previous rationales, these rationales for restricting speech con-
stitute the effects of the speech: specifically, the excluded organizations’
speech could disrupt the workplace, harm the success of the fundraising
effort, or create an appearance of political favoritism. Because the effects
were not in response to any particular message or opinion of speakers,
the regulation was viewpoint neutral.
In sum, if the rationale for restricting speech is disapproval of a mes-
sage within the content—whether or not the disapproval is of one mes-
sage or multiple messages—the restriction is viewpoint discriminatory.
Likewise, if the rationale is based on effects that are in response to a
message within the content, the restriction is viewpoint discriminatory.
However, if the rationale is unrelated to the message, including the ef-
fects of speech that are nonresponsive to the message, the restriction is
viewpoint neutral.
With these principles in mind, we now consider whether denying copy-
right protection for a moral reason would constitute viewpoint
discrimination.
2. Moral Denials of Copyright Protection
The viewpoint-neutrality requirement severely limits Congress’s ability
to implement moral values through denying copyright protection. In most
instances, a denial of protection because of Congress’s moral viewpoint
would target the speaker’s moral viewpoint. More precisely, if the ratio-
nale for the denial is that Congress believes the message within the con-
tent does not promote the progress of science, the rationale would be
viewpoint discriminatory. Congress would be judging that a message is
not worth promoting. For example, consider hypothetical denials for con-
tent specifically advocating against abortions, gun rights, or mail-in vot-
ing. The reason for the denial is Congress’s moral view on these subjects,
which necessarily contradicts the view of the speaker. Congress would be
denying protection because of its contradictory belief.
What about denials of copyright protection for content that does not
advocate for any position, but rather, only portrays a certain expression?
For instance, suppose that Congress were to deny protection for content
218. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 790 (1985).
219. Id. at 813. The Court ultimately remanded the case for a determination on whether
the government had excluded certain groups because of their viewpoints rather than this
purported reason. Id. at 812–13.
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that portrays teen pregnancy or depictions of teen drug use. Although the
denial might not explicitly state a position on those situations, the Court
would consider the rationale for the denial. Likely, the rationale is to
prevent the messages of teen pregnancy or drug use from influencing
teenage audience members. If that is the rationale, Congress would be
targeting the effects of the messages on their audiences, so the denial
would be viewpoint discriminatory. Furthermore, the argument that
viewpoint discrimination is occurring becomes even stronger in the ab-
sence of evidence that the content causes harmful effects that are unre-
lated to their messages. Hence, the denial would be viewpoint
discriminatory.
The question thus arises as to whether Congress may ever apply a
moral value to deny copyright protection. Can a moral reason for denial
ever be viewpoint neutral? The answer is yes. A moral reason that is
viewpoint neutral would be one that does not relate to the speaker’s mes-
sage or the effects that are responsive to that message.220 The first subsec-
tion below provides examples of such viewpoint-neutral denials, and the
next subsection provides further examples of viewpoint-discriminatory
denials.
a. Viewpoint-Neutral Examples
i. Expression Necessitating the Commission of a Violent Crime
Suppose that Congress denies protection for expression that necessi-
tates the author committing a violent crime while creating the expression.
The denial would apply where the author commits the criminal act for the
purpose of creating the expression. Whether a person murders someone
in order to photograph a murdered corpse, films himself committing the
murder in order to create a video of the act, or murders someone simply
to steal the victim’s camera and photograph the sunset—this bar to copy-
right protection would apply. The expression need not include any por-
trayal of the violent act to be barred from protection.
The denial of copyright protection for such content would be viewpoint
neutral because the rationale would be to refrain from rewarding criminal
actions with the economic benefit of copyright. That rationale would not
relate specifically to anything in the content itself; rather, it would relate
to the actions involved in creating the content. Regardless of whether the
content of the expression portrays the criminal act, the denial would ap-
ply. Hence, the rationale would be viewpoint neutral.
ii. Trade Secrets
Congress might deny protection for content that comprises another
220. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 394–95 (1992).
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person’s trade secret.221 The denial would apply to persons who lack per-
mission to reproduce or publish the trade-secret information. If I learn of
confidential information that trade secret law protects, and I lack author-
ity to disclose it, I would not be able to receive copyright protection for
my expression of the information.
The rationale for this denial would be to prevent unfair business prac-
tices and unlawful behavior.222 This reason would stem from the illegality
of exercising the copyright right of public distribution: specifically, public
distribution of the trade secret would be unlawful.223 The denial, then,
would be based on the unlawful effects of exercising a copyright right.
Importantly, though, the reason would not be to prevent the public from
learning the information contained within the trade secret. That reason
would be viewpoint discriminatory because it essentially seeks to prevent
listeners from learning the messages within the content of trade secrets.
Instead, the reason for the denial would be to reduce the incentive to
commit an unlawful act. Unrelated to any message within a trade secret,
that reason for the denial would be viewpoint neutral.
iii. Virtual Reality
Suppose that Congress were to deny copyright protection for virtual-
reality games. As a matter of policy, this seems imprudent. Nevertheless,
there could be a viewpoint-neutral reason for denying protection. Studies
indicate that virtual realities can cause some users to experience vertigo,
nausea, or dizziness.224 Certainly this is debatable.225 Yet, assuming it is
at least a reasonable basis for Congress to refrain from extending protec-
tion under its power to promote the progress of science,226 the basis
221. See generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 34 U.S.C.).
222. See Abbott Labs v. Norse Chem. Corp., 147 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Wis. 1967) (“The
law concerning trade secrecy developed as common law. The basis of the doctrine is an
attempt to enforce morality in business.”).
223. See generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016.
224. See, e.g., Hironori Akiduki, Suetaka Nishiike, Hiroshi Watanabe, Katsunori Mat-
suoka, Takeshi Kubo & Noriaki Takeda, Visual-Vestibular Conflict Induced by Virtual Re-
ality in Humans, 340 NEUROSCIENCE LETTERS 197, 199 (2003); Huw Jones, Virtual Reality:
Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, 2 VIRTUAL REALITY 147, 148 (1996).
225. See, e.g., Chun-Chia Lee, Kuo-Lun Hsiao & Chia-Chen Chen, Exploring the Bene-
fit and Sacrifice Factors of Virtual Reality Gameplay, FRONTIERS PSYCH., Mar. 10, 2020, at
1, 2.
226. The Supreme Court has opined that it affords Congress wide discretion in exercis-
ing its power under the Copyright Clause. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court explained:
[W]e turn now to whether it is a rational exercise of the legislative authority
conferred by the Copyright Clause. On that point, we defer substantially to
Congress.
. . . .
. . . [W]e are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations
and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise
they may be. . . .
. . . .
. . . [I]t is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to
pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.
537 U.S. 186, 204, 208, 212 (2003).
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would be viewpoint neutral. The purported effects of the games are unre-
lated to any message contained within the virtual-reality games. Any
viewpoints contained in the virtual realities are irrelevant to the reason
for denial.
Now suppose that Congress were to deny protection for those games
on the basis that they are a waste of time, leading many adults to lead
unproductive lives.227 This basis would be viewpoint discriminatory. The
judgment that virtual-reality games are a waste of time implicitly chal-
lenges a viewpoint inherent in those games—namely, that they are worth
viewing. Indeed, if the waste-of-time rationale were deemed to be view-
point neutral, Congress could deny protection for any view with which it
disagreed on the basis that the message is a waste of time, or in other
words, that it is not worth listening to. Obviously, that cannot be the case.
Hence, the moral reasons of unproductivity or waste of time would imply
viewpoint discrimination.
These two hypothetical bases for denial illustrate that the reason for
denial must be clear.228 As explained above, viewpoint discrimination
hinges on the government’s rationale for restricting speech.229 The same
denial could be either viewpoint neutral or viewpoint discriminatory de-
pending on the objective rationale for denial. For this discussion though,
we assume that the government can make the requisite showing to estab-
lish the rationale for its denial.
iv. Pornography
Congress might deny protection for pornographic works. This speech
receives First Amendment protection.230 Pornographic expression repre-
sents content that is sexually explicit in a way that indicates an intent of
the creator to stimulate a sexual experience in his or her audience.231 It
encompasses content that may include more than that which is legally
obscene.232
Two reasons support the denial of protection for pornographic content.
227. See Maeve Duggan, Gaming and Gamers, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2015), https://
www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/12/15/gaming-and-gamers [https://perma.cc/4TYA-
QBFU] (finding the public is closely split on the issue of whether video games are a “waste
of time”).
228. See generally United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1968) (“Inquiries
into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply
the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for gui-
dance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in[
]this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress’
purpose.”).
229. See discussion supra Section III.C.1.
230. See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324–325 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
231. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property, 23 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 119, 121 n.8 (2012).
232. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (defining obscenity as content
“which, taken as a whole, appeal[s] to the prurient interest in sex, which portray[s] sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do[es] not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”).
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The first is to discourage acts of violence against women.233 The creation
of pornography often involves committing such violent acts. Congress
might desire to avoid supporting such violence. This reason, then, is much
like the example cited at the beginning of this subsection—denying pro-
tection where an author commits a violent crime as part of the creative
process. Unlawful activity or violent acts in the creative process represent
reasons that do not concern the message in the pornographic content.
Whether or not that content actually portrays those acts is not the reason
for denial. Rather, the reason is the fact that those actions often occur as
part of the creative process.
The second reason is that consumption of pornography often leads to
detrimental effects on the public. Consumption leads to decreased sexual
satisfaction,234 increased likelihood of divorce,235 increased likelihood of
casual sexual encounters by adolescents,236 and increased occurrences in-
volving sexual aggression.237 Hence, both the creative process and the
consumption of pornography result in harmful effects that serve as rea-
sons for denial.238
Importantly, these two reasons do not condemn or otherwise respond
to any viewpoint within pornographic content.239 Indeed, the reasons that
condemn the effects of producing and viewing pornography are entirely
consistent with the idea of sexual activity, which pornographic content
portrays. Those who object to pornography usually do not object to
sex.240 Therefore, the reasons for denial appear viewpoint neutral.
233. See Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 799, 818–20 (2008).
234. Dolf Zillmann & Jennings Bryant, Pornography’s Impact on Sexual Satisfaction, 18
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 438, 449–50 (1988).
235. Samuel L. Perry & Cyrus Schleifer, Till Porn Do Us Part? A Longitudinal Exami-
nation of Pornography Use and Divorce, 55 J. SEX RSCH. 284, 292 (2018).
236. See generally Jochen Peter & Patti M. Valkenburg, Adolescents and Pornography:
A Review of 20 Years of Research, 53 J. SEX. RSCH. 509, 519, 523 (2016) (finding that
pornography use was strongly correlated to permissive sexual attitudes, gender-stereotyp-
ing, earlier experimentation with sexual intercourse, increased experience with casual sex,
and higher instances of sexual aggression).
237. Id. at 523.
238. To be clear, my argument here does not rely on or adopt the reasoning of City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). In City of Renton, the Court held
constitutional a local zoning ordinance that prohibited adult-film theaters “from locating
within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park,
or school.” Id. at 43. Puzzlingly, the Court deemed the zoning ordinance to be content
neutral, even though the ordinance specifically noted that it was restricting businesses that
sold, rented, or showed “sexually explicitly materials.” Id. at 44, 48. On this basis, the
decision has been criticized by judges and academics alike. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 334–38 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part); Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 413, 484–91 (1996). In contrast to City of Renton, my argument does not rely
on the premise that copyright denial of pornographic material is content neutral.
239. See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291,
314 (2009) (“[P]ornography does not typically express any concrete viewpoint (although it
may be used to do so), but rather, is characterized by its sexual explicitness.”).
240. See Ned Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous Speech, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2331, 2335–36 (2018) (observing that the public does not disagree with the idea of sex in
pornographic portrayals).
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One might argue that pornographic expression implicitly asserts that
using pornography to experience sexual stimulation is good for society.
Yet the presence of such an implicit viewpoint is dubitable. The view that
using pornography is moral is not necessarily (perhaps not even usually)
implicit within pornographic content.241 And even if it were, that would
not matter. The reason for denying pornography is not because of any-
thing that the speaker is saying. The reason is because of pornography’s
harmful effects that are unrelated to the content’s message. So regardless
of what pornographers might be asserting through their content, Con-
gress is simply seeking to avoid supporting creations that harm society.
That is the reason.
b. Viewpoint-Discriminatory Denials
Denying copyright for expression that is related to criminal activity
would likely be a popular choice by Congress. Below are three such hypo-
thetical denials. All would likely be viewpoint discriminatory.
i. Live Depictions of Murder
Congress might consider denying copyright protection for live record-
ings of murderous behavior. Unlike the first example in the subsection on
viewpoint-neutral examples, this denial would apply to any author of such
expression, regardless of whether the murderer created the film. The
moral reason for this denial is likely that such depictions are upsetting to
much of the population. That reason would be viewpoint discriminatory
because it is based on listeners’ reaction to the message of the content.242
The offensiveness would be in direct response to the message, and as the
Court has recently noted: “Giving offense is a viewpoint.”243 Hence, the
offensiveness of content cannot be a viewpoint-neutral reason.
This example contrasts with the viewpoint-neutral example introduced
at the beginning of this subsection—namely, denying protection for ex-
pressions that necessitate the author committing a violent crime. In that
example, denying protection because of an unlawful act in the creative
process is not contingent upon any message within the expression, so the
denial would be viewpoint neutral. By contrast, in this example, denying
protection for recordings of unlawful acts does require an examination of
the content; the denial reflects a disagreement with the acts portrayed, so
it would be viewpoint discriminatory. Thus, the seemingly small distinc-
241. Creators of pornography likely believe and portray just the opposite view, seeking
to capitalize on the moral suggestion that content should not be consumed. Indeed, the
immoral nature of content appeals to a certain audience. A reputation of immorality yields
curiosity that fuels demand. Hence, pornographic content itself does not imply a view that
its consumption is appropriate or moral. To the contrary, it often suggests just the opposite
view.
242. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464, 482 (2010) (holding unconstitu-
tional a statute that criminalized “depictions of animal cruelty”).
243. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion).
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tion in scope between these two examples makes a constitutional differ-
ence under the First Amendment.
ii. Recordings of Mass Shootings
Related to the above example, Congress might consider denying pro-
tection for live recordings of mass shootings, regardless of whether the
perpetrator creates the recording. The reason for this denial could not be
to refrain from rewarding unlawful actions, for the mere act of recording
is not unlawful, and the person who records the atrocity is not likely the
person who is responsible for it.244 Hence, refraining from supporting un-
lawfulness would not seem to be a reasonable basis for denying this
content.
A different reason though, is that when such recordings become public,
they increase the likelihood of perpetrators mimicking the violent behav-
ior. The theory is called mass shooting contagion.245 The reason for de-
nial, then, relates to the message’s behavioral effect on other potential
mass shooters. This reason would therefore seem directly related to the
message of the content, akin to restricting speech because certain views
might result in civil unrest. Simply put, a viewer’s tendency to mimic a
message or to act inappropriately because of the message appears to be
an effect that is directly responsive to the viewpoint in the message—
killing people. Therefore, this denial would not be viewpoint neutral.
iii. Crime-Facilitating Speech
Congress might consider denying copyright protection for speech that
facilitates certain types of criminal activity. In his landmark article,
Crime-Facilitating Speech, Professor Eugene Volokh considers First
Amendment issues that surround this sort of speech, i.e., speech that pro-
vides information that makes it easier for people to engage in unlawful
conduct.246 Volokh argues that, with few exceptions, crime-facilitating
speech should receive First Amendment protection.247 An example of
such speech is The Anarchist Cookbook, which provides instructions on
how to commit a variety of crimes, from creating bombs to manufacturing
illicit drugs.248
A copyright denial for this material would be viewpoint discriminatory.
Congress would be denying copyright protection because Congress dis-
agrees with authors advocating for or providing information about crimi-
244. See, e.g., David Heinzmann, Home Security Video Captures Close-Up Images of
Gunman Killing Companion at Point-Blank Range in Rogers Park, CHI. TRIB. (July 3,
2020, 7:50 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-shooting-video-rogers-
park-20200704-2fpy43zaevfbroacna33yrjkym-story.html [https://perma.cc/22LX-YQ76].
245. See Adam Lankford, Fame-Seeking Rampage Shooters: Initial Findings and Empir-
ical Predictions, 27 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 122, 127–28 (2016).
246. Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1096–1102
(2005).
247. See id. at 1106.
248. See generally WILLIAM POWELL, THE ANARCHIST COOKBOOK (1971).
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nal activity. Even though Congress would not disagree with the truth of
the matter asserted within crime-facilitating content—for instance, a
description about how to make a bomb—Congress would be objecting to
that message because of consequences that supposedly follow directly
from the message. In particular, readers might engage in unlawful con-
duct in direct response to the viewpoints asserted in the material. Hence,
Congress’s disagreement with that consequence, which follows directly
from the viewpoint in the message, would be viewpoint discriminatory.
Accordingly, Congress could not deny copyright protection for crime-fa-
cilitating speech.249
D. OTHER STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Part examines whether other standards of review might better ap-
ply in evaluating moral restrictions on copyright eligibility. It considers
strict scrutiny, rational basis, and intermediate scrutiny.
1. Strict Scrutiny
The strict scrutiny standard of review represents the normal framework
for evaluating whether content-based restrictions on speech are constitu-
tionally permissible. Strict scrutiny sets a high bar for the government to
justify its content restriction: the government must demonstrate that the
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a governmental interest that is
compelling.250 To that end, the government “must specifically identify an
‘actual problem’ in need of solving, and the curtailment of free speech
must be actually necessary to the solution.”251 Public disapproval of con-
tent cannot be the problem,252 and the means of curtailing the speech
249. A specific type of crime-facilitating speech raises a complication. Malware consists
of a computer program that gives instructions for the computer to carry out, often em-
ployed to hack into or cause harm to another computer. Malware, FED. TRADE COMM’N:
CONSUMER INFO., https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0011-malware [https://perma.cc/
96LZ-TSLV]. The reason for denying copyright protection would be to protect against such
harmful effects of the malware, which are usually unlawful. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 156.00–.50 (McKinney 2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-20 (2020); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 943.70 (West 2020). This reason relates directly to the message of the software in that the
message consists of instructions to a computer. The instructions are intended to effectuate
the bad results, and the denial is in response to those results. On this basis, the denial
would seem viewpoint discriminatory. Nevertheless, the reason for denying protection to
malware could be to restrict the criminal activity itself—not merely speech about the activ-
ity. Expressing the malware code to a computer is part of the criminal act. Arguably, then,
Congress is targeting the criminal action by restricting the code, which may suggest a dif-
ferent standard of review under United States v. O’Brien. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
(“[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). If targeting the criminal
action itself, the denial of copyright protection would not be unconstitutional.
250. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
251. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (citations omitted) (quoting
United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822–23 (2000)).
252. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118 (1991).
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must be the least restrictive available.253 Hence, given the rigidity of the
strict scrutiny standard, the Court has observed: “It is rare that a regula-
tion restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”254
In the copyright context, any content restriction (moral or otherwise)
would not satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Consider the established
copyright doctrine that denies protection for expression that is factual in
nature or that is not otherwise sufficiently creative.255 According to Su-
preme Court precedent, denial of protection for this content reflects a
constitutional requirement under the Intellectual Property Clause.256
That is to say, the Clause values the production of creative expression
over factual or non-creative expression. Nevertheless, this reason for de-
nying protection does not suggest an actual problem that warrants speech
suppression. Specifically, the “problem” of not enough creative speech
does not appear to be sufficiently compelling so as to justify restricting all
non-creative speech. Indeed, there does not appear to be any actual prob-
lem in need of solving. Thus, a fundamental content-based requirement
of copyright protection—content must be creative—would fail a strict
scrutiny analysis. And if this content-based requirement cannot pass strict
scrutiny, the First Amendment would be inconsistent with the Intellectual
Property Clause. This seeming contradiction suggests the appropriateness
of adopting a more lenient standard of review.
Professor Yen has argued that copyright’s restrictions cannot be subject
to a blanket strict-scrutiny standard. He points to the 1790 Copyright
Act’s content-based copyright protection for any “map, chart, book or
books,” and the fact that the 1790 Act continued in effect even after the
First Amendment was ratified in 1791.257 This is strong evidence that the
Framers did not intend for the First Amendment to preclude content-
based legislation under the Intellectual Property Clause. Hence, the his-
tory of copyright appears to preclude the strict scrutiny standard of re-
view for content-based restrictions in copyright.
2. Rational Basis
The rational basis standard of review cannot apply to moral restrictions
on copyright eligibility. The standard is highly deferential, requiring only
that a statute be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.258
It does not apply where a statute implicates a First Amendment inter-
est.259 As argued in Section II.B, moral restrictions on copyright protec-
253. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
254. Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818).
255. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (opining
that copyright does not protect facts or unoriginal expression).
256. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884); Feist, 449
U.S. at 346–47.
257. See Yen, supra note 132, at 1258–59.
258. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 728 (1997).
259. See generally Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019)
(“[T]he law does not implicate a fundamental right and is therefore subject only to ordi-
nary rational basis review.”).
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tion implicate the speech rights of authors. Hence, rational basis cannot
apply.
This conclusion is not disturbed by Supreme Court case law applying
rational basis review in copyright cases that have raised speech issues. In
Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court considered Congress’s extension of the
copyright term for an additional twenty years, which applied to works
that authors had already created under a shorter term.260 In Golan v.
Holder, the Court considered Congress’s similar act of re-copyrighting
works whose term had already expired.261 In both cases, petitioners chal-
lenged Congress’s acts on First Amendment grounds: Congress arguably
restricted speech of people who desired to repeat expressions that were
about to enter, or had already entered, the public domain.262 In other
words, petitioners argued that Congress had restricted speech of copiers.
The Court dismissed those challenges on the basis that the constitutional
purpose of copyright—to incentivize free speech—justified Congress’s
expansion of the monopoly protection, even though that meant restrict-
ing copiers’ speech.263
Eldred and Golan are inapposite to the situation where Congress
targets immoral content in denying copyright protection. Unlike moral
restrictions on copyright protection, the legislative acts in Eldred and Go-
lan did not target specific content. Extending the copyright term and re-
copyrighting public domain works are not content-based statutes.264
Moreover, the Court in both cases was faced with speech interests of
copiers—not authors. Indeed, the Eldred Court noted: “The First
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to
make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the
right to make other people’s speeches.”265 The Court thus recognized a
free speech distinction between speech rights of copiers and authors.
Lastly, the Eldred Court relied on speech-protective doctrines (fair use
and the idea–expression dichotomy) that address speech interests of copi-
ers to justify its less demanding speech analysis.266 Therefore, the Court’s
260. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192–93 (2003).
261. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 307 (2012).
262. See id. at 307–08; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193, 218.
263. Golan, 565 U.S. at 327–28; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. The Eldred Court stated:
We reject petitioners’ plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a
copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and
safeguards. The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close
in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s lim-
ited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed, copy-
right’s purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free expression.
537 U.S. at 218–19.
264. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amend-
ment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 48, 49 (2001) (“[Copyright’s] target is not the viewpoint,
subject matter, or even communicative impact of the infringer’s speech, but rather the
infringement’s deleterious impact on the copyright incentive.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Bal-
ancing Copyright Protection and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is
Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83, 93 (2002) (agreeing with and quoting same).
265. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
266. Id. at 219–20.
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deference to Congress in Eldred and Golan should not be interpreted as
justifying a less restrictive speech standard for evaluating content-based
restrictions for copyright eligibility.
3. Intermediate Scrutiny
The last standard of review to analyze is intermediate scrutiny. A
speech restriction is justifiable under intermediate scrutiny only if the re-
striction directly advances a substantial government interest and is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve that interest.267 This standard governs speech
regulations in the commercial context. It provides the government more
flexibility to regulate speech in the commercial context than the strict
scrutiny standard would otherwise provide.268
Professor Yen has argued for applying this standard in evaluating con-
tent restrictions on copyright eligibility.269 In my view, that argument
makes sense to a certain extent, even though expression that may be eligi-
ble for copyright protection is not necessarily commercial speech per
se.270 Yen has observed that copyright protection enables commercial
markets for the sale of copyright rights, and legislatures need flexibility to
fine-tune the commercial incentives that copyright protection creates.271
For this reason, copyright has a clear commercial component. Yen further
observes that intermediate scrutiny is consistent with Congress’s copy-
right power under the Progress Provision: the standard is less stringent
than strict scrutiny, allowing Congress some discretion in deciding the
subject matter of copyright protection.272 These reasons make sense, so I
agree that the intermediate standard could apply.273
267. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017); Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
268. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
269. Yen, supra note 132, at 1257–60. Professor Yen also argues that strict scrutiny
should apply for content-based regulations that are viewpoint discriminatory in the Copy-
right Act. Id. at 1260–62. Such heightened scrutiny for viewpoint discriminatory regula-
tions is inherent in the intermediate scrutiny analysis. In other words, if commercial speech
is viewpoint discriminatory, it is invalid even under the intermediate scrutiny standard. See
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565, 572 (2011) (applying “heightened judicial
scrutiny” to speech regulations that “are aimed at a particular viewpoint,” within the con-
text of applying intermediate scrutiny where “the State must show at least that the statute
directly advances a substantial governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to
achieve that interest”).
270. See generally Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561, 563 (defining commercial speech as
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience” and
“speech proposing a commercial transaction”).
271. Yen, supra note 132, at 1258–59.
272. Id. at 1258.
273. Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel and Erwin Chemerinsky have argued for inter-
mediate standard in reviewing speech restrictions that incidentally follow from the Copy-
right Act. See Netanel, supra note 264, at 54–69 (arguing for intermediate scrutiny in
evaluating speech-restrictive effects of the Copyright Act on the public); Chemerinsky,
supra note 264, at 93–94. Professor Eugene Volokh has also opined on the appropriate
standard for reviewing copyright restrictions, arguing that content-based restrictions in in-
tellectual property law must be subject to strict scrutiny unless they fit within a First
Amendment exception. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property:
Some Thoughts after Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 712
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I nevertheless maintain that the limited public forum doctrine is a bet-
ter fit for content-based restrictions on copyright eligibility. The reason is
that copyright’s constitutional purpose would moot much of the interme-
diate scrutiny analysis. Consider the government’s interest in denying
copyright protection for specific content that it considered to be immoral:
the interest would be to refrain from incentivizing expression that is con-
trary to the progress of science. This interest must necessarily be substan-
tial given the Progress Provision’s grant of discretionary authority to
Congress to incentivize content that promotes progress.
The next question in the intermediate scrutiny analysis is whether a
denial of protection for that content would directly advance this interest.
The answer will depend on whether the rationale for the denial is that the
content does not, in fact, promote progress. In that regard, a rationale
that is viewpoint discriminatory would not be an acceptable one because
intermediate scrutiny requires viewpoint neutrality.274 Rather, the ratio-
nale must be based on the content’s harmful effects that are nonrespon-
sive to any message in the content, like those discussed above in Section
III.C.2.a. Only if the content gives rise to such effects would denying
copyright directly advance the government interest of not incentivizing
content that fails to promote progress.
Assuming the government can demonstrate such harmful effects, the
government would also satisfy the requirement that the restriction be
narrowly drawn. Under the Intellectual Property Clause, denying copy-
right protection for content represents a constitutionally endorsed means
of refraining from incentivizing content that fails to promote the progress
of science.275 That is, to deny copyright protection is to refrain from exer-
cising the power to promote progress. Accordingly, as the constitutionally
prescribed means for not incentivizing content that would fail to promote
progress, the copyright denial would necessarily be narrowly drawn.
(2003). Their arguments, however, are not relevant to this analysis because they contem-
plate restrictions that result from enforcing a copyright. Specifically, copyright owners can
compel other speakers not to publish, display, or perform their copyrighted expression. See
17 U.S.C. § 106. Enforcing a copyright means that those other speakers face court orders,
hefty monetary fines, and even jail time for speaking the copyrighted expression. See id.
§§ 502, 504, 506. This speech restriction is very different from the indirect economic pres-
sure that speakers face when deciding what original expression to speak. The absence of
copyright protection for speaking content is not the same as an injunction, weighty dam-
ages, or a prison term. Denying copyright protection for a speaker is like denying an artist
a grant for their artwork, whereas punishing a copyright infringer is like punishing a spy for
speaking secrets. Compare Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88
(1998) (considering effect of “decency and respect” criteria for artistic grant), with 18
U.S.C. § 798 (criminalizing disclosure of classified information). Although copyright’s two
types of speech restrictions arise under the same Copyright Act, the restrictions employ
different methods of influencing speech, so they should have different standards of review.
This is all to say that other professors’ conclusions on the standard of review for restric-
tions in the Copyright Act are not directly relevant to this analysis.
274. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565, 572.
275. See discussion supra Section III.B.2 (observing that the Intellectual Property
Clause provides Congress direction to decide whether to copyright content).
2021] Barring Immoral Speech 213
Thus, application of intermediate scrutiny comes down to showing
harmful effects that follow from, but are nonresponsive to, the specified
content. Intermediate scrutiny would therefore be very similar to the test
for whether the restriction is viewpoint neutral, discussed in the Section
above.276 In view of this fact, the limited public forum seems to be a bet-
ter fit for copyright than intermediate scrutiny because its viewpoint neu-
trality requirement essentially captures the import of the intermediate
scrutiny analysis. Indeed, much of the intermediate scrutiny test is super-
fluous in view of the Intellectual Property Clause. Specifically, the Clause
implies that the government’s interest is substantial, that denying protec-
tion for harmful content directly advances that interest, and that the de-
nial of copyright protection is a narrowly drawn restriction of speech.
Limited public forum seems to be a better fit.
IV. CASE LAW
Several cases seem relevant to the examples of viewpoint-neutral copy-
right denials discussed above. Taken out of context, the cases could ap-
pear to stand in conflict with those examples. This Section, therefore,
discusses these free speech cases.
A. SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC. V. MEMBERS OF NEW YORK STATE
CRIME VICTIMS BOARD
In 1991, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a “Son
of Sam” law in the case of Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New
York State Crime Victims Board.277 The New York legislature had passed
a statute that required a criminal’s income from works that described his
crimes to be placed into an escrow account for the victims of the crime.278
The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the First Amend-
ment.279 By forcing criminals to place their profits into the escrow ac-
count, “the statute plainly impose[d] a financial disincentive only on
speech of a particular content.”280 The Court never stated whether the
content discrimination was viewpoint neutral or discriminatory, although
scholars have suggested that it is viewpoint neutral.281 This conclusion
appears to be correct because the rationale underlying the statute was to
compensate victims for criminal acts, and that rationale does not depend
on any specific message within the criminal accounts.282
276. See discussion supra Section III.C.2 (analyzing whether moral restrictions on copy-
right eligibility would be viewpoint discriminatory).
277. 502 U.S. 105, 108 (1991).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 123.
280. Id. at 116.
281. See e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 446 (1995) (classifying Simon & Schuster as a viewpoint-neutral case).
282. It is even possible that the legislature could have desired for more criminals to
write narratives (and generate income) so as to increase the compensation for victims.
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Simon & Schuster should not be interpreted as suggesting that copy-
right denials for any reason related to criminal activity would violate the
First Amendment. This was not a limited public forum case; instead, the
Court applied strict scrutiny.283 Therefore, assuming that the discrimina-
tion in Simon & Schuster is viewpoint neutral, the case is still consistent
with the viewpoint-neutral copyright denial contemplated above, i.e.,
where Congress denies protection for persons who commit violent acts in
the process of creating expression.284 One could argue, however, that the
discrimination in Simon & Schuster is viewpoint discriminatory on the
grounds that the New York legislature was targeting the criminal’s per-
spective about committing a crime. Yet even if the restriction in Simon &
Schuster is viewpoint discriminatory, the reason for denying copyright
protection for persons who commit violent acts while creating expression
is not to disagree with a criminal’s portrayal of his violence. The copyright
denial would apply regardless of whether the criminal portrays any un-
lawful action in the content of his expression: unlawful behavior is the
reason for the copyright denial, not a portrayal of unlawful behavior.
Hence, Simon & Schuster should not be understood as prohibiting Con-
gress from denying copyright protection because of an author’s criminal
behavior.
B. AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS ASS’N V. HUDNUT
In 1985, the Seventh Circuit decided American Booksellers Ass’n v.
Hudnut, a case in which the court struck down a city ordinance that pro-
hibited various uses of “pornography.”285 Although Hudnut is not bind-
ing Supreme Court authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in
a memorandum opinion.286 Three other federal appellate courts have
cited to it, so it may be described as a well-established “pornography”
decision.287 Its reasoning should therefore be considered in light of the
copyright restriction on pornography that this Article contemplates.
Like this Article’s hypothetical denial of copyright protection for por-
nography, the ordinance in Hudnut did not define pornography according
to the legal definition of obscenity.288 Rather, the ordinance defined por-
nography as the presentation of women in one of several specified man-
ners that would constitute “graphic sexually explicit subordination.”289 In
a decision by Judge Frank Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit held the ordi-
nance to be an unconstitutional restraint of free speech.290
283. Simon, 502 U.S. at 118.
284. See discussion supra Section III.C.2.a.i.
285. 771 F.2d 323, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
286. Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 475 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1986) (mem.).
287. See, e.g., Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 740 F.3d 1136, 1138–39 (7th
Cir. 2014); Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 200
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
288. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 334.
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In the opinion, Easterbrook accepted the claims that pornography
tends to lead to harmful consequences. He accepted that pornography
leads to the subordination of women, which in turn leads to effects such
as “affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home, [and] bat-
tery and rape on the streets.”291 Easterbrook did not dispute that pornog-
raphy fosters aggression and contempt toward women and harms their
opportunities for equality.292 All these effects, however, did not matter to
Easterbrook; instead, the effects “simply demonstrate[d] the power of
pornography as speech.”293 The effects of pornography, explained Easter-
brook, are akin to the persuasive effects of religious ideals or political
movements, or to the problems that some believe come from watching
too much television.294 Furthermore, the fact that an audience’s response
to pornography is often subconscious did not bother Easterbrook.295 He
opined that the subconsciousness of pornography’s effects merely illus-
trates that pornography conditions its audience to act and think in a cer-
tain way.296 Easterbrook concluded that the effect of subconscious
conditioning is no reason to refrain from protecting the speech that
causes it.297
Perhaps one might infer from the court’s treatment of the ordinance in
Hudnut that Congress cannot deny copyright protection for pornography.
Hudnut contemplates two factual circumstances that are similar to the
copyright-denial context. First, both the copyright denial and the Hudnut
ordinance define the content at issue, pornography, with a meaning that
depends on, at least in part, expression that is “sexually explicit” as op-
posed to low-value obscenity that is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment.298 Second, both rely on the effects of pornography as a basis for
their respective restrictions of speech.299 Based on these two points of
similarity, one might reason that because pornography is protected by the
First Amendment, its harmful effects should not be reason to restrict it,
and therefore, copyright cannot be denied for it.
This conclusion is wrong. It is true that Hudnut establishes that pornog-
raphy, as contrasted with obscenity, receives First Amendment protec-
tion. Hudnut establishes that pornography cannot be restricted in the
absence of a compelling government interest (outside of a context that
implies a less restrictive standard).300 And Hudnut emphasizes that the
socially harmful effects of pornography do not rise to the level of a com-
pelling government interest.301 But that is all that Hudnut stands for.
291. Id. at 329.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 329–30.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 330.
297. Id.
298. See id. at 331–32.
299. See id. at 328.
300. See id. at 326.
301. See id. at 334.
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Hudnut does not suggest that pornography receives stronger speech pro-
tection than any other sort of protected speech.
These simple points about Hudnut are important because the fact that
speech is protected by the First Amendment does not place it outside the
scope of content for which Congress may deny copyright protection. Con-
gress’s authority to deny copyright protection is not in any way based on
whether the content under consideration receives free speech protection.
Rather, its authority is based on the constitutional directive that content
should promote the progress of science.302 If there is a rational basis to
conclude that the content does not promote progress, and if Congress’s
reason is viewpoint neutral, Congress can deny it, regardless of whether
the content receives First Amendment protection.303 Put another way,
the First Amendment does not mandate a copyright monopoly for all
speech within its scope of protection.
Of course, the Intellectual Property Clause is still subject to restraints
of the First Amendment. The context of the copyright denial dictates
those restraints—in particular, the restraints that inhere in a limited pub-
lic forum.304 As discussed above, that doctrine allows for the government
to restrict speech protected by the First Amendment insofar as specific
conditions are met. Therefore, the fact that Hudnut establishes First
Amendment protection for pornography does not alter the fact that por-
nography is subject to less speech protection from government restric-
tions under the limited public forum doctrine. Like any other speech
protected by the First Amendment, Congress may deny copyright protec-
tion to pornography within the confines of that doctrine.
What about Hudnut’s discussion about pornography effects—namely,
that pornography’s effects are evidence of its power as speech, so those
effects should not serve as a basis for government restriction?305 Does
that conclusion upset the analysis for denying copyright protection for
pornography, which is premised on pornography’s harmful effects? It
does not. Here again, context is dispositive. In considering whether cer-
tain categories of speech promote the progress of science, Congress must
consider the effects of speech. Indeed, the word Progress implies an eval-
uation of effects.306 Promoting progress contemplates an evaluation of
whether the effects of speech or inventions are socially beneficial.
This is not to say that Easterbrook’s point about the effects of speech is
entirely irrelevant. As discussed above, effects of speech as a reason for
restricting speech are relevant in analyzing whether the restriction is
viewpoint discriminatory. Specifically, disagreement with effects that are
responsive to the viewpoint within a message suggests a disagreement
302. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
303. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the limited public forum’s application to
the copyright context).
304. See discussion supra Part III.
305. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
306. See Snow, supra note 131, at 180 (arguing that Progress provides Congress discre-
tion to achieve specific goals).
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with the message itself.307 But where the government’s objection is to
effects that are nonresponsive to the message, this does not suggest any
disagreement with the viewpoint.308 Hypothetically, if pornography
caused blindness, the government’s objection to the effect would cer-
tainly not discriminate based on any viewpoint in the pornography. The
harmful effects that actually do follow from pornography are no different.
They are non-responsive to the message.
C. TRADEMARK CASES
Two recent Supreme Court cases in the trademark context are relevant
to denying copyright protection for moral reasons. In both trademark
cases, the Court held that certain statutory bars to trademark protection
violated the First Amendment. Specifically, in Matal v. Tam the Court
struck down a bar that had denied protection to marks that could “dispar-
age” others,309 and in Iancu v. Brunetti the Court struck down a bar that
had denied protection for “immoral” and “scandalous” marks.310 In both
cases, the Court held the statutory bars to be viewpoint discriminatory.311
The cases do not address copyright specifically, yet they are still valua-
ble for that context simply because they concern speech restrictions in an
intellectual property regime. The cases are instructive for copyright deni-
als in particular because trademark affects a spectrum of speech that is
similar to that affected by copyright. Trademarks serve as brand names
for goods or services, and through them, mark owners may communicate
ideas on any subject matter.312 Their subject matters include politics, sci-
ence, artwork, entertainment, education, commerce, and everything
else—just like the subject matters of copyright.313 Matal and Brunetti
therefore likely suggest principles that the Court would apply in evaluat-
ing moral restrictions on copyright protection.
1. Matal v. Tam
The facts of Matal v. Tam consisted of an individual, Mr. Simon Tam,
choosing the name, “THE SLANTS,” as a trademark for his band in or-
der to “reclaim” or “take ownership” of stereotypes associated with per-
sons of Asian descent.314 The PTO found that the term was offensive to
Asians and thereby denied Mr. Tam’s application under the statutory bar
of the federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, which precluded regis-
tration of disparaging marks.315 The Supreme Court reversed the denial
of registration, unanimously concluding that the disparagement bar was
307. See discussion supra Section III.C.2.
308. See discussion supra Section III.C.2.
309. Iancu v. Brunetti, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
310. 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
311. Id. at 2299; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763.
312. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751–52.
313. See id. at 1768. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
314. Id. at 1754 (majority opinion).
315. Id.
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viewpoint discriminatory in violation of the First Amendment.316
Although the Court overwhelmingly reached the conclusion that the
disparagement bar was viewpoint discriminatory, that conclusion is, in
one sense, puzzling. The disparagement bar did not appear to target any
specific ideology, opinion, or perspective of the speaker. It did not give a
particular side an advantage in a public debate; neither side was allowed
to disparage. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a plurality opinion that recog-
nized this fact, specifically noting: “[The disparagement bar’s restriction]
evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups. It applies equally to
marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and socialists,
and those arrayed on both sides of every possible issue.”317 Stated differ-
ently, the disparagement bar did not seem to discriminate based on any
specific viewpoint or opinion.
Alito, however, provided a resolution to the apparent problem that the
disparagement bar did not seem viewpoint discriminatory. He explained:
“Giving offense is a viewpoint.”318 A person might desire to offend
others for the sake of being offensive—not because the person cares
about any specific opinion that he or she is asserting but merely because
the person desires to be disagreeable. In that situation, the disparagement
bar seems viewpoint discriminatory: it forecloses the specific perspective
of a person who seeks to be offensive for the very sake of being offensive
(not for the sake of furthering the underlying idea that offends).
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, joined by three
other Justices, that is also helpful to understand the Court’s reasoning.319
He too recognized the viewpoint-discriminatory nature of the disparage-
ment bar.320 Rejecting the argument that the bar was viewpoint neutral
because it applied equally to all trademarks that offend, Kennedy pointed
out that “[t]o prohibit all sides from criticizing their opponents makes a
law more viewpoint based, not less so.”321 He explained that viewpoint
discrimination was apparent from the government’s disapproval of a sub-
set of messages it finds offensive.322 Like Alito, then, Kennedy objected
to offensiveness as a reason for the government to deny protection. That
the bar applied to all viewpoints did not mean that it was viewpoint
neutral.
Tam thus teaches a principle about the viewpoint-discrimination analy-
sis. A bar to protection cannot be based on the offensiveness of expres-
sion. That an author seeks to offend others is no reason to deny
protection. Even if a bar denies protection for a seemingly broad scope of
expression, the bar is not viewpoint neutral if the reason for denial is
Congress’s offense at, or disagreement with, the content.
316. Id. at 1754, 1765.
317. Id. at 1763.
318. Id.
319. See id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1766.
322. Id. at 1767.
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This conclusion supports the explanation of viewpoint discrimination in
Section III.C above, which interprets Supreme Court jurisprudence as im-
plying that Congress may not deny copyright protection on the ground
that Congress finds any message within the expression offensive. A mes-
sage’s offensiveness cannot be the reason for the denial.
2. Iancu v. Brunetti
In Iancu v. Brunetti, a business owner had applied to register a mark
that closely resembled the F-word as a brand name for his clothing
line.323 The PTO denied his application under the Lanham Act’s bars that
precluded registration of terms that were “immoral” or “scandalous.”324
Reversing the PTO, the Court struck down these bars as viewpoint
discriminatory.325
The Court unanimously held that the “immoral” bar was viewpoint dis-
criminatory.326 The Court split, however, on the issue of the “scandalous”
bar.327 The majority interpreted scandalous as having an overlapping
meaning with immoral, so the same reasoning underlying the immoral bar
also applied.328 The other Justices had a different interpretation of scan-
dalous that is not relevant to the issues under consideration here.329 For
ease of reference, I refer to both the immoral and scandalous bars collec-
tively as “the immoral bar.”
Writing the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Kagan explained the rea-
son for concluding that the immoral bar was viewpoint discriminatory:
[T]he Lanham Act permits registration of marks that champion soci-
ety’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not marks that denigrate
those concepts. . . . [T]he statute, on its face, distinguishes between
two opposed sets of ideas: those aligned with conventional moral
standards and those hostile to them; those inducing societal nods of
approval and those provoking offense and condemnation. The stat-
ute favors the former and disfavors the latter.330
The immoral bar thus enabled, and indeed required, the government to
pass judgment on whether particular ideas were morally acceptable.
Stated differently, the immoral bar required the government to suppress
ideas that it deemed inappropriate. This was viewpoint discriminatory.331
Importantly, the Brunetti Court never suggested that a specific moral
reason cannot serve as the basis for denying protection. The problem in
Brunetti was not the fact that moral grounds were the basis for denial, but
323. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
324. Id. at 2298.
325. Id. at 2297.
326. Id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
327. See id. at 2302 (majority opinion).
328. Id. at 2300.
329. See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2304
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
330. Id. at 2299–2300 (majority opinion).
331. See id. at 2300.
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rather, the problem was the fact that the immoral bar called for a judg-
ment about the message within the content. To be sure, the Court never
suggested that a moral reason is an inappropriate basis for denying pro-
tection. Indeed, several Justices opined that bars denying protection for
obscene, vulgar, or profane marks would be constitutional because they
do not target any viewpoints within the expression (instead targeting the
mode of expression). Chief Justice John Roberts stated: “[R]efusing regis-
tration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not offend the First
Amendment.”332 Justice Alito stated: “Our decision does not prevent
Congress from adopting a more carefully focused statute that precludes
the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no real part in
the expression of ideas.”333 Justice Breyer stated: “[I]t is hard to see how
a statute prohibiting the registration of only highly vulgar or obscene
words discriminates based on ‘viewpoint.’”334 Justice Sotomayor stated:
“Adopting a narrow construction for the word ‘scandalous’—interpreting
it to regulate only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity—would save it from
unconstitutionality.”335 According to these four Justices, bars to obscene,
profane, or vulgar marks would not be viewpoint discriminatory. The fact
that such bars would be based on the moral viewpoint that those sorts of
marks are harmful to society would not imply their unconstitutionality.
The majority opinion in Brunetti is consistent with this conclusion. In
condemning the morality bar, the majority noted: “We say nothing at all
about a statute that covers only [marks that offend by their mode of ex-
pression]—or, in the Government’s more concrete description, a statute
limited to lewd, sexually explicit, and profane marks.”336 The majority
was thus careful to preclude from its holding bars that specifically target
lewd, sexually explicit, and profane content. Even though such bars
would be effectuating a moral viewpoint of Congress, this language in
Brunetti is consistent with the conclusion that such bars would not be
viewpoint discriminatory.
Thus, neither Tam nor Brunetti suggest that the First Amendment pre-
cludes Congress from denying copyright protection to expression on
moral grounds.337 Consistent with the analysis in Part IV, the cases sug-
gest that protection may not be denied in response to a speaker’s
message.
332. Id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
333. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
334. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
335. Id. at 2313 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
336. Id. at 2302 n.* (majority opinion).
337. Cf. Gary Myers, It’s Scandalous!—Limiting Profane Trademark Registrations after
Tam and Brunetti, 27 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 20 (2019) (interpreting Brunetti as allowing
Congress to “preclude the registration of obscene, vulgar, and profane marks”); Ned Snow,
Immoral Trademarks After Brunetti, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 401, 450 (2020) (arguing that trade-
mark bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene content would be constitutional under Brunetti
and Tam).
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V. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property incentivizes ideas. It is a means to facilitate crea-
tivity and knowledge for the broader purpose of promoting progress in
society.338 To further that broader purpose, Congress has chosen, and yet
may choose, not to extend intellectual property protection to certain sub-
ject matters.339 According to the moral views of Congress, certain subject
matters may be detrimental to that broad purpose. Yet because denying
intellectual property protection affects the production of creative expres-
sion and innovative knowledge, the denials necessarily affect speech.340 A
denial chills the potential speech of authors and inventors. Hence, a ten-
sion exists between Congress’s power to promote progress through legis-
lating copyright and patent and the people’s right to freely speak without
government interference.
The tension may be resolved by applying the correct doctrines of free
speech law. On the patent side, those speech doctrines suggest that Con-
gress’s restrictions on eligible subject matters do not violate the First
Amendment. This is because the effects on inventors’ speech that subject-
matter restrictions introduce are likely manifestations of the government
adopting private speech as its own. Furthermore, even if the restrictions
do not reflect speech choices by the government, they likely reflect gov-
ernment regulation of conduct related to embodiments of inventions. The
regulation’s incidental effect on free speech would be permissible under
the O’Brien test. Hence, in most circumstances, subject matter restric-
tions on patent protection would be constitutional.
On the copyright side, moral restrictions on eligibility should be ana-
lyzed under the limited public forum doctrine. Under that doctrine, re-
strictions of content are permissible if, first, they are reasonable in light of
the forum’s purpose, and second, they are viewpoint neutral.341 The first
requirement will usually be satisfied because the Intellectual Property
Clause provides Congress discretion to determine which content pro-
motes the progress of science.342 By contrast, the second requirement im-
poses a severe limitation on Congress’s ability to discriminate under its
copyright power.343 Specifically, Congress’s reason for denial must not
concern the message within the content or the effects that are responsive
to that message.
Congress, then, can deny patent protection for human organisms, mari-
juana devices, abortion methods, and many more inventions that stir
338. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
339. See 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (“No patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or
discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic en-
ergy in an atomic weapon.”); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.)
(“[N]o patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”).
340. See discussion supra Part II.
341. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).
342. See discussion supra Section III.B.
343. See discussion supra Section III.C.
222 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
moral controversy.344 Congress can also deny copyright protection for
limited categories of content, such as pornography, trade secrets, and ex-
pression involving unlawful actions in its creation.345 This is not to say,
though, that such denials would reflect good policy. That is a question for
another day. Today, I conclude that in certain circumstances, Congress
may exercise its intellectual property power to effectuate moral judg-
ments about speech.
344. See discussion supra Section II.A.
345. See discussion supra Section III.C.2.
